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1. Introduction 
As with any country, the way religion intertwines with the history of the United States has 
shaped the landscape of everyday life. More than just a part of history, religion as it is lived and 
experienced in the United States shapes the public space. Notably, within the last forty years there 
has been a movement of many Christian groups to connect their religious beliefs with their political 
beliefs. Terms such as Evangelical, Fundamentalist, or Religious Right have come to characterize a 
certain ethos embraced by many Americans of this religious and political movement. Embracing 
very specific values which this group seeks to codify into law, this group has met much opposition 
in its desire to pass legislation with specific Christian interpretations. As such, this conflict has 
emerged time and again over conflicts of social, cultural, and political importance. On divisive 
issues such as this, clear lines have been drawn, and people have entrenched themselves in their 
positions on these issues. This leaves us with a conflict in stalemate, antagonistic participation, and 
a situation with seemingly no resolution for people so entrenched in their values.  
The question this paper seeks to address is how to transform this identity based conflict 
between the this political-religious movement and its opposition. In order to look at possible ways 
forward, I will use social identity theory to understand how group identity affects conflicts such as 
this, and apply previous research on this topic to the Religious Right. Using social identity theory 
will allow me to examine the social-psychological aspects of this group and how these features 
affect the conflicts the Religious Right has with its opponents. Through this, I will be able to 
discuss possible ways forward utilizing approaches based on this theory.  
First, I will present social identity theory as a way to understand group identities, and 
demonstrate how a social identity functions within an intergroup conflict. Second, I will give the 
recent history of this religious and political movement in the United States and discuss the 
Religious Right as a social identity. Finally, working with the theory and applying it to the group as 
presented in its history and its current state, I will suggest possible avenues for transforming this 
conflict from its current intractable state towards an avenue of productive disagreement within 
American society.  
2. Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict 
In this chapter, I will set out my theoretical framework around social identity theory and 
intergroup conflict. First, I introduce the relevance of identity to intergroup conflict. Secondly, I 
introduce social identity theory as my theoretical frame. Thirdly, I will define conflict and violence, 
as well as delineate the goals of conflict resolution attempts. Following these definitions, I will 
discuss how social identity theory can give insight into both how conflicts arise and how conflicts 
may be eased. 
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2.1 The importance of Identity and Identification 
At the outset, it is worth identifying the importance of identity and identification. At the risk 
of stating the obvious, I will begin by saying that identifying with a group is a social process. This 
social nature, however obvious it may be, is crucial in understanding how people come to belong to 
define themselves in terms of certain groups and not others, how groups understand themselves and 
their role in society, how individuals see themselves within a group, and many other processes 
foundational to the quest to understand groups in conflict. Groups, their identities, goals, and 
purposes are negotiated by those within the group and are affected by those outside. The nature of 
any group is shaped by its context and the society of which it is part. When we look at how groups 
form, how people come to belong to groups, and how these groups function in conflict and in peace, 
we are observing primarily social phenomenon rather than the behavior of individuals.  
At the outset of such a project as this, it is worth bringing to the forefront why questions of 
identity and social identity are a productive means to understand conflict. Conflict, as it is often 
understood, is centered on material competition or ideological differences. The people in the midst 
of conflict are, in the various forms of media, typically represented as rational, self-invested actors 
who are acting in their own self-interest in situations of competition for scarce materials or 
motivated by differences of ideology. However, this is often not the case, particularly in the case of 
protracted conflicts which span years, and even generations. While conflicts may start out over 
concrete issues, Vallacher et al. point out that "over time, however, conflicts tend to center on less 
tangible issues involving moral superiority, values, and other aspects of human existence that are 
not amenable to practical solutions"1.While many conflicts start out through clear and concrete 
disagreements or competition, over time, conflicts become anchored in issues not defined by the 
initial disagreement. Because of this, a traditional approach to motivation in intergroup conflict 
cannot adequately capture the driving factors in long-term conflicts.2 People in these protracted 
conflicts often act in ways that would go against their own self-interest, and defy explanations based 
on the assumption of a purely rational actor acting on self-interest.3 Rather than rational self-interest, 
identity is one such aspect of human cognition which shapes how people act in conflict in ways that 
may defy logic. Groups and group identities both give shape to and are, in turn, shaped by 
protracted conflict. Intangible issues such as morality and values, which drive the conflict, 
interweave with how people and groups define themselves and function in times of conflict. 
Therefore, in searching for way forward out of a conflicted situation, it is insufficient to focus on 
                                                          
1 Robin R. Vallacher et al. “Why Do Conflicts become Intractable? The Dynamical Perspective on Malignant 
Social Relations.” In The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict., ed Linda R. Tropp (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 14-15.  
2 Vallacher et al, 17. 
3 Vallacher et al, 17-18 
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the presenting issues, and deeper, identity-based issues require consideration. Amid such protracted 
conflicts, it is necessary to look for a theory that can provide a better understanding of how to 
escape these protracted conflicts which are no longer about the issues over which the conflict arose. 
I believe social identity theory is one such theory.  
2.2 Social Identity Theory 
In this section, I set out to do three things. First, I present how social identity has been 
defined, looking at several definitions. Secondly, I will discuss why and how a social identity is 
formed. Finally, I will discuss how social identity is measured and how I will measure social 
identity for the scope of my project.  
Social identity has been defined in many ways. Tajfel and Turner, when they first introduced 
the concept, defined social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from 
his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership."4 This definition was later expanded by Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Blackwell to include intragroup behavior, defining social identity as 
"self-categorizations that 'define the individual in terms of his or her shared similarities with 
members of certain social categories in contrast to other social categories."5 Ervin Staub claims that 
"social identity theory has focused on how people categorize themselves (and others) as members of 
groups, how they identify themselves with certain groups, and the tendency they have to enhance 
themselves by comparing their group favorably with other groups."6 Korostelina has defined social 
identity as "a feeling of belonging to a social group, as a strong connection with social category and 
as an important part of our mind that affects our social perceptions and behavior."7 While these 
definitions all differ in some small ways, they all paint a picture of the same phenomenon, and may 
all be useful for providing a basic understanding of what a social identity is.  
Social identity theory answers both questions of personal and group identity. According to 
the theory, “people derive their self-concepts, in part, from their membership in social groups.”8 
This socialized identity as a part of a larger system becomes part of the definition of one’s self. As 
Robert White puts it, "For those who employ the concept of social identity, the self is a product of 
                                                          
4 Lee Jussim, Richard D. Ashmore, and David Wilder, “Introduction” in Social Identity, Intergroup conflict, 
and Conflict Reduction, ed Richard D. Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001),  6. 
5 Robert W. White, “Social and Role Identities in Political Violence” in Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, 
And and Conflict Reduction ed. Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 139. 
6 Ervin Staub. “Individual and Group Identities in Genocide and Mass Killing” in Social Identity, Intergroupg 
Conflict and Conflict Reduction, ed Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 164.  
7 Karina V. Korostelina. Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics, and Implications (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 15.  
8 Rezarta Bilali and Michael A.Ross, “Remembering Intergroup Conflict” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Intergroup Contact (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012),  127 
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comparison and categorization processes in which the 'perceiver appraises the self in relation to 
others.'"9 
Social identity is not an intrinsic part of a person; rather, it is a social construction and 
influenced by the existing social structures.10 It is also not something that people can always choose. 
One can have a social identity placed on them on the basis of religion, race, ethnicity, or other 
factors through which others may categorize them. While individuals may exert some control over 
groups with which they identify, they do not get to define the group. Thus, while some social 
identities may involve a certain level of choice or ideological commitment, individuals do not create 
the categories with which they may align themselves.11   
2.3 Forming a Social Identity 
 Thinking about the formation of a social identity, it is first important to ask why such 
identities are formed before we consider how they are formed. Social identities meet several 
psychological needs and serve several functions. Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory gives a 
great deal of insight into why these identities develop. Speaking about this theory,  Korostelina tells 
us, "Brewer's theory of "optimal distinctiveness" suggests that people have the dual need for 
distinction from a group (intercategory contrast) and for inclusion in it (intracategory 
assimilation)."12  Developing a social identity fulfills both of these needs. As Korostelina points out, 
"thus, identification fulfills two main functions; (1) realization of the individual need to belong to a 
group that provides protection and confidence and (2) inclusion of a person into a system of social 
relationships."13 Furthermore, identities such as this reduce uncertainty.14 For those who are highly 
identified, a person can find within the identity a clear understanding of how the world is, how it 
should be, and how one should act in the world.  
As a person forms or connects with a social identity, there are two key processes. First, one 
cognitively associates oneself with the group. Beyond simply categorizing oneself as a part, 
however, "Social identification, then, entails affective and evaluative processes that are above and 
beyond mere cognitive classification of the self and others into a shared social category."15 
Categorization and the corresponding evaluative processes are the substance of a social identity, and 
                                                          
9 White, 139.  
10 Herbert C. Kelman, “The Role of National Identity in Conflict Resolution” in Social Identity, Intergroup 
Conflict, and Conflict Reduction, ed. Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 194.  
11 Jack Citrin, Cara Wong, and Brian Duff. “The Meaning of American National Identity” in Social Identity, 
Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction ed. Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 72 
12 Korostelina, 66.  
13 Korostelina, 19.  
14 Korostelina, 66.  
15 Marilynn B. Brewer. ”Ingroup Identification and Intergroup Conflict” in Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, 
and conflict Reduction ed. Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 21.  
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understanding how these processes work in a person’s connection with an identity is important. In 
this section, I will explore these two processes as they occur in the process of forming and 
connecting with a social identity.  
In social identity theory, the concept of categorization plays an important role in 
understanding its formation. Indeed, as Brewer points out, "Virtually all current theories of social 
identity and intergroup relations recognize social categorization as the basic cognitive process 
underlying all intergroup phenomena."16 This kind of categorization is a basic feature of cognition, 
both for individuals and groups which allows people to simplify the world around them.17 As 
Dovidio et al put it, "Categorization enables decisions about incoming information to be made 
quickly, because the instant an object is categorized it is assigned the properties shared by other 
category members."18 As a feature of human cognition, it is not something humans can escape, but 
will inform how people make decisions and see all aspects of the world. Social identity, formed by 
such categorization, "results from the categorization of the world into ingroup and outgroup and the 
labeling of oneself as a member of the ingroup."19 
As a result of this categorization, stereotypes form as a natural consequence.20 These 
stereotypes do not always reflect reality, and are by this definition, simplifications which do not 
carry an ability to represent the complexity of the identity of the other. Indeed, as Dovidio et al tell 
us, "Distinctions between members of different categories become exaggerated. Thus, 
categorization enhances perceptions of similarities within and differences between groups."21 These 
stereotypes, regardless of how accurate they are, still inform how people understand the world to be 
real. As such, while they may at times be a caricature at best, they still shape the reality from which 
people function.  
In social categorization, Korostelina tells us there are three stages. She writes, "During the 
first stage, individuals define themselves as members of a social group; in the second, they learn the 
stereotypes and norms of the group; and in the third, group categories influence the perception and 
understanding of all situations in a particular context."22 The cognitive processes at the level of the 
individual are clearly influenced by context and setting; one must learn with which groups one can 
possibly identify, and once that is completed, how to behave and how to think as a member of one’s 
group.  
                                                          
16 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 19 
17 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 20 
18 John F. Dovidio et al. “Divergent Intergroup Perspectives” in The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict 
ed. Linda R. Tropp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 159.  
19 Kay Deaux. “Models, Meanings, and Motivations” in Social Identity Processes ed Dora Capozza and Rupert 
Brown (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 17.  
20 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 20. 
21 Dovidio et al, 160 
22 Korostelina, 25 
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While this categorization is the psychological foundation for social identity theory, social 
identity theory cannot be reduced to categorization. As noted above, the categorization allows a 
person to identify as part of a group; it is the emotional and evaluative processes which allow a 
person to identify with the group to which they belong.23 These evaluative approaches are laden 
with values and morality. While generally, one views positively the group to which he or she 
belongs, it cannot be assumed they do so.  
It is this portion of the formation of a social identity which is most variable. The strength of 
this emotional connection to the group and the positivity of the evaluations play a major role in how 
closely one identifies with a group, how much one will assume the values of the group, and how 
closely one’s own identity is tied into this group. Through her research, Korostelina points out that 
these emotional evaluations are a more powerful predictor of intergroup attitudes than the 
cognitive.24 While these emotional and evaluative processes may be harder to evaluate or less clear 
than the categorization which occurs, it is likely far more significant in determining behavior.    
2.4 Measuring Social Identity 
Given the purpose of my project, it is important to discuss how one can measure and speak 
about social identity. As noted above, the two key components of social identity are categorization 
as a member of the group and emotional attachment to the group. Any measure of social identity 
must examine and account for these in some way. Additionally, I need to account for the salience of 
the people who hold such an identity.  
 Salience is a key term in speaking about the levels at which one holds a social identity. 
Before moving forward with measurements, it is here helpful to define and understand these terms. 
Very simply understood, a salient identity is the most important identity for a person. Or as some 
would describe it, a strong social identity is a salient social identity.  Salience is the level at which 
one identifies with a group, and ranges from low to high.25 As Korostelina puts it, "One's salient 
identity characterizes one's core position within other identities and does not depend on the 
situations of intergroup relations. It influences one's thinking and behavior even in situations 
lacking an opposing category or identity."26 Salience, therefore, is a zero-sum proposition; in order 
for one identity to become more salient, other identities a person or group may hold become less 
salient.27 Salience is not a feature of the group, but of an individual’s relation to the group.  
                                                          
23 Citrin, Wong, and Duff, 73-74.  
24 Korostelina, 169.  
25 Korostelina, 71.  
26 Korostelina, 20.  
27 Korostelina, 71.  
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A highly salient identity means that intergroup boundaries are sharply drawn, whereas less 
salient identities are more open.28 A highly salient social identity moves a person from viewing their 
group as equal with other groups to superior to others and becoming more ingroup-centric.29 
Additionally, a salient social identity means that the ingroup goals and values carry more weight 
than those rooted in individual identity.30 As social identities become more salient, the importance 
of the ingroup, as well as the clarity of who is in and who is out, increases. As these boundaries 
become clearer, the interactions with the outgroup become more difficult and less positive.31  
In Korostelina’s work, she outlines three factors as determinants of the salience of different 
social identities: level of difference, prevalence of intergroup or interpersonal contact, and 
competition among groups.32 Greater levels of differences relates to the guiding process in social 
identity theory of categorization. The greater the differences, the greater the role categorization will 
have in the process. The prevalence of intergroup or interpersonal contact “with other people as 
typical members of outgroups strengthen identification with ingroup sand lead to the formation of a 
salient social identity.”33 And, the greater the competition between groups, the more salient the 
related identity becomes.34  
She also identifies three factors that lead to an increase in the salience of social identity: the 
existence of a majority or prevalence of people relating to a specific social category, threatening or 
negative attitudes toward the ingroup, and a change in a person’s goals and values on account of 
situational changes. In situations described by her first factor, the existence of nationality, class, 
language, or other such majority groups can lead to more salient social identities. Secondly, if an 
ingroup comes under threat or attack – physical, verbal, or otherwise – the corresponding identity 
usually becomes more salient. As Korostelina writes, “those negative sentiments can promote 
enhanced ingroup solidarity, loyalty, and subsequent negative attitudes toward the outgroup.”35 
Thirdly, a change in goals and values in relation to one’s situation can become significant. As 
someone grows in his or her profession, attends a certain university, converts to a different religion, 
or goes through another such change, each of these changes can become significant if they attach 
their social identity to it.36 However, overall, Korostelina tells us that. “Any change in the social 
situation or balance of power will lead to an increase in the salience of corresponding identity.”37  
                                                          
28 Korostelina 44. 
29 Korostelina, 62.  
30 Korostelina, 73.  
31 Korostelina 44. 
32 Korostelina, 72-73.  
33 Korostelina, 73 
34 Korostelina, 73.  
35 Korostelina 116.  
36 Korostelina, 116.  
37 Korostelina 117.  
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 As established, there are two key components of social identity: categorization and affective 
evaluations of the category. Both of these must be taken into account in order to effectively measure 
or speak of social identity. To measure social identity moving forward, I will focus on three things. 
First, to adequately speak about the social identity of the group, I will define the characteristics of 
the group which, for its members, are defining features. Second, but related to the first point, I will 
speak about the content of the social identity. This will examine the normative behavior, 
expectations, and values. By focusing on these two things, we can define the categorization process 
which takes place in social identity theory and clarify what a group identifies with and the 
boundaries which they draw. Thirdly, I will speak about the salience of the group, which will take 
into account the emotional and evaluative aspects in addition to the categories above. By looking at 
social identity through these three things, I will be able to identify specific characteristics of the 
group that may play a specific role in the ongoing conflict, and by addressing the specific nature of 
these three features of the social identity, make proposals for moving forward out of the conflict.  
2.5 Defining Conflict, Violent Conflict, Peace  
In this section, I set out to define these terms and clarify what are reasonable goals for those 
working in conflicted situations.  While definitions of these terms may appear on the surface to be 
simple, the common usage betrays a complexity behind these terms. Once these terms are defined, 
in this section I also set out what the goals are for working in a conflicted situation such as the one 
the Religious Right is in, showing how resolution as commonly used is an inadequate means for  
The first issue with defining conflict is our encounter with its negative connotation in our 
speech and usage. Conflict itself is not a bad thing; it motivates change, and can lead to better 
cooperation, allocation of resources, or other positive outcomes. Susan Optow suggests that 
constructive conflict is characterized by "cooperative processes, a focus on mutual gains, open 
communication, and trust."38 She also states "Conflicts are important junctures for surfacing urgent 
concerns about fairness that can effect positive change."39 While much of the conflict presented in 
the news media is negative, the reality is that our lives are shaped by many conflicts that are 
necessary for positive growth. Unfortunately, not all conflicts are carried out constructively. Optow 
characterizes destructive conflict as "competitive processes, antagonistic interests, impoverished 
communication, suspicion, and harsh tactics."40 Conflict is an inevitability, but its destructive nature 
is not.  
Drawing from Galtung's work Peace by Peaceful Means, there are three kinds of violence in 
conflict. While a question of violence for many of us may draw up images of war and battle, for 
                                                          
38 Susan Optow. “The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Intergroup Conflict ed. Linda R. Tropp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 82. 
39 Optow., 82. 
40 Optow, 82. 
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Galtung, no shots need to be fired for a conflict to be violent. Galtung identifies direct violence, 
structural violence, and cultural violence as the ways in which conflicts may be violent.  
Direct violence is present if there is an actor who intends immediate consequences upon a 
recipient.41 This is fairly straightforward, and is what most of us think of when we hear the word 
violence. Structural violence, which Galtung suggests is the same thing as indirect violence, exists 
when there is not that actor with immediate intentions on violence. "The two major forms of outer 
structural violence are well known from politics and economics: repression and exploitation. Both 
work on the body and mind, but are not necessarily intended."42 Cultural violence is behind all other 
forms of violence; "all of it symbolic, in religion and ideology, in language and art, in science and 
law, in media and education." Cultural violence functions to legitimize direct and structural 
violence.43 
It is worth pointing out here that conflicts can be violent without direct acts of violence. 
While the idea of violent conflict may bring to mind images of warfare, genocide, or tyrannical 
governments, in fact, violence need not be so overt. Rather, structural and cultural violence can 
inflict harm as well. Governments denying rights, healthcare, or necessary services – while not 
commonly defined as violent – can be understood to be a means of violence.  
Drawing from Galtung's work, there are two definitions of peace that he offers, negative 
peace and positive peace. In his words, negative peace “is the absence/reduction of violence of all 
kinds."44 This kind of peace is defined by the absence or negation of violence. It is called negative 
because its definition relies on a negation, not because it has a pessimistic outlook. Positive peace 
defines peace as "nonviolent and creative conflict transformation."45 He continues later "by positive 
peace we mean a cooperative system beyond 'passive peaceful coexistence', one that can bring forth 
positively synergistic fruits of the harmony."46 It is worth noting that these definitions are not in 
opposition to one another, but rather, are complementary. As such, a full definition of peace would 
not be one or the other, but would encompass both. Peace, therefore, is more than just the absence 
of violence, though the absence of violence is required. It is a system, in which people interact 
positively with one another and support one another. It requires action, cooperation, and the 
development and maintenance of a healthy system of coexistence.   
Having looked at definitions, it is now important to discuss the goal or aim of people 
working in a conflicted situation. There is a challenge when talking about what the goal is when 
                                                          
41 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means (Oslo: International Peace Institute, 1996), 2. 
42 Galtung, 2. 
43 Galtung, 2. 
44 Galtung 9, 31.  
45 Galtung 9.  
46 Galtung 61.  
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working in conflicted situations. Often, we hear of conflict resolution, implying that the conflict at 
hand is simply over resources, and once that issue finds a solution that is amenable to both parties, 
the conflict is thus successfully resolved. While this does work for some conflicts, it is hardly the 
case for all. In the case of protracted conflict, conflict is not something that can be simply resolved 
when conflict has moved beyond tangible issues. What is at stake in these conflicts is not the 
resolution of issues, but the transformation of how people approach conflict and see themselves in 
relation to it. Success under this approach is more than simply resolving the issues. Therefore, 
success is defined not based on resolution, but on moving conflict from a toxic, destructive or non-
productive stalemate forward to a healthy way through which problems can find solutions. As 
Vellacher et al. describe it,  
The central issue of conflict resolution, then, is not how to resolve the existential or tangible 
issues in dispute. Rather, the issue is how to transform the system from the coordinated 
ensemble of dynamics perpetuating the conflict to a different coherent state that allows for 
benign (or perhaps positive) relations between the parties.47 
 
Given this, conflict is therefore analyzed as a system of action rather than as a set of issues, and the 
success of an approach to conflicted situations is based not on its ability to resolve the presenting 
issues but to shape the system toward a different, more productive end.  
There are many different ways to productively or unproductively exist in conflict. Vellacher 
et al list as characteristics of intractable conflicts as being based on existential issues, having poor 
ingroup and outgroup relations, and based on emotionality.48 As described previously, Optow 
described destructed conflict in terms of competition, antagonism, poor communication, suspicion, 
and harsh tactics.  Beyond these markers, violence, hostility, and aggression are obvious signifiers 
of toxic conflict. To move conflict in a positive direction means moving conflict away from these 
modes of thinking and operating.  
Because of this, the rest of this paper is working on two assumptions. Firstly, for identity 
based conflicts such as those I will show the Religious Right to be in, resolution of presenting 
issues is not actually a means to overcoming conflict. Rather, the goal is moving conflict away from 
a toxic system towards positive relations between the two conflicted parties. Secondly, positive 
peace, not a negative peace, is the end goal which leads towards positive conflict transformation 
and reduction. Thus, peace is considered not a one-time goal, but a system which requires 
maintenance to continue functioning positively.   
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2.6 Social Identity and Intergroup Conflict 
As it relates to intergroup conflict, social identity can provide a useful lens for 
understanding. As noted above, it is insufficient to simply look at the proximate causes of a conflict 
in cases of protracted conflict. Social identity, as I will show, both shapes and is shaped by 
intergroup conflict, and in order to address conflicts in which the social identity of a group plays a 
role, these identities must be accounted for. Additionally, I will show how various theories based on 
a social identity perspective, can use insights from the theory in order to understand social identities 
roles in conflict and conflict reduction. Social identity theory gives a language through which to 
understand certain facets of human cognition. It is not a theory about causes of conflicts, nor is it a 
theory about how to end conflicts. However, its insights how humans function provide a valuable 
means to understand how certain aspects of conflict develop. Therefore, understanding social 
identity theory in conflict is to understand how it can give shape to the dynamic and structure of 
conflicts.  
2.6.1 Social identity as a contributor to conflict 
 There are many features of social identity that may lead to increasing hostility or negative 
conflict. However, it is an incorrect assumption to make that all social identities unequivocally lead 
to conflict. As Gibson points out, “the dominant view among social psychologists today is that the 
relationship between ingroup and outgroup attitudes is conditional in nature.”49 Thus, we cannot 
assume that a social identity, however strong, will inevitably lead towards a violent conflict. 
Marilyn Brewer has identified a continuum along which “each element in the progression provides 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for occurrence of the subsequent elements.”50 At each point 
along this continuum, conflict or hostility become more likely. She divides the continuum in to four 
principles that are distinguishable: the social categorization principle, the ingroup-positivity 
principle, the intergroup comparison principle, and the outgroup hostility principle.51 She notes that 
“Within this system, the first two elements are probably universal characteristics of human social 
groups (as Sumner postulated), but the third and fourth elements require additional social structural 
and motivational conditions that are not inherent in the processes of group formation itself.”52 
Having already focused quite heavily on categorization as a feature of human cognition and social 
identity, I will here focus on the remaining three principles which move conflicts toward the more 
violent end of the spectrum. 
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Brewer’s ingroup positivity principle is the second point on her spectrum. The very idea of 
self-categorization in social identity theory implies a positive benefit and positive affective 
connection with a group. Here, Brewer cites her optimal distinctiveness theory, which outlines an 
individual’s need for inclusion into collectives, yet differentiating oneself from others.53 She argues 
that groups meet the need for inclusion, and that the boundaries of self-categorization meet the need 
of sufficiently differentiating oneself from other people. Optimal distinctiveness theory means that 
these needs of inclusion and differentiation are the driving motives for social identification. 
However, Brewer points out that “although the desire for self-enhancement may not be a primary 
cause of ingroup identification, identification may well lead to a motivation to view the ingroup in 
the most favorable possible terms.”54 
According to Brewer, a human's ability and desire form groups comes from our evolutionary 
need for interdependence for survival. We need to trust others, and others need to trust us; however, 
it is dangerous to be too trusting as we may be taken advantage of. An ingroup to which we are 
loyal (and, in turn, is loyal to us) serves as an important categorical tool which protects us from 
sharing our resources with those who would take advantage of us. Brewer defines ingroups as 
"bounded communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual interdependence and 
cooperation."55 From this standpoint, recognizing someone as part of our ingroup carries significant 
weight with how we would interact with another person or group. This recognition is not simple, 
however; it is a categorization which labels a person as a part of the ingroup or not. Furthermore, 
this kind of categorization lowers risk, as Ashmore points out: "social categorization and clear 
group boundaries provide one mechanism for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence 
without the risk of excessive cost."56  
Because the ingroup is based on people knowing who they can trust, this leads to positive 
connections with others we perceive to be as part of our ingroup and the absence of those feelings 
toward the outgroup. Positive feelings, which translate into positive actions for the ingroup, can 
begin to show some of the ways in which a salient social identity can exacerbate intergroup conflict. 
Prejudices are one way in which this can play out. For example, Ashmore points out that subtler 
forms of racism are not defined by the strength of negative feelings toward minorities, but the 
absence of positive sentiment towards them.57 These positive feelings alone, and regardless of 
animosity for an outgroup, can lead to preferential treatment for the ingroup.  
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Those who one categorizes within one's group, according to Brewer, are afforded social 
benefits of belonging to the group that are not shared by the outgroup, and on an emotional level, 
seen as non-threatening and beneficial for their fellow members. As Brewer puts it, "Ingroup 
positivity implies a sort of self-absorption where group members attend to the concerns and welfare 
of their own group with disregard for the status or outcomes of those outside the ingroup 
boundary."58 This kind of positivity, while not reliant on a negative view of other groups, still can 
easily result in concrete asymmetries in the treatment of groups. Through this, we can see that a 
lack of a negative view of others does not mean that all groups are viewed equally by those within 
an ingroup, and even simply treating one's group favorably can create tension based on the resulting 
inequalities. As Brewer writes, "If social groups differ in access to resources and power, the 
benefits of ingroup favoritism accrue to members of some groups more than others and contribute 
to substantial differences in outcomes between the groups as a whole."59 This kind of inequality can 
certainly lead to conflict, or enhance existing conflict.  
This brings us to the next place along Brewer’s continuum, which she calls intergroup 
comparison. Any social identity, as stated previously, exists among a myriad of other possible 
identities. As such, the evaluative aspects of social identity do not happen solely with the 
knowledge of the ingroup, but they happen in the presence of alternate identities and outgroups. As 
established in the previous section, there exists a great desire to judge the ingroup positively. While 
this evaluation can be judged against internal standards of what is good, Brewer points out that in 
most cases “knowledge of the status of outgroups becomes relevant to assessing the state and 
welfare of the ingroup.”60 She continues, “The need for social comparison is aroused when there is 
uncertainty about one’s standing on some dimension of self-evaluation, uncertainty that can be 
resolved by comparing one’s own position to that of relevant others.”61 Here, she stresses the 
importance of the relevance of the outgroup – that which is being compared to needs to be a valid 
measurement of status for comparison. Thus, it is not against all outgroups, or outgroups chosen at 
random, which ingroups choose to compare to, but it is specific groups which provide the ingroup 
its own measure of status.   
It is worth noting that this type of comparison still does not have to be negative; one can 
make comparisons “for purposes of objective self-appraisal or to motivate self-correction and 
improvement.”62 However, Brewer points out that when these become both relative and evaluative 
assessments, defining oneself positively becomes a competitive proposition, and the judgements 
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move from ‘we are good’ to ‘we are better.’ As she sums it up, “Combined with motivations for 
self-enhancement, then, social comparison becomes social competition and the pursuit of positive 
self-regard can be achieved only at the expense of the other.”63 
There are several aspects of this worth noting. Firstly, Brewer points out that “the more 
similar groups are in their values and aspirations, the more acute the intergroup social 
competition.”64 Because of this, groups which are more similar may encounter more conflict than 
groups which are less similar. Secondly, groups of different statuses display different bias and 
behavior. The positions of groups in society will shape how they act. Thirdly, where there are many 
dimensions of evaluation, “social competition for positive distinctiveness may be more diffused and 
less intense.”65 If there are more criteria for comparison rather than less, based on this research it 
lowers the intensity of resulting competition or negative feelings.  
This brings us to the final point on this end of Brewer’s continuum of outgroup hostility. 
Brewer establishes the distinction between comparison, as described above, and aggression. Here, 
aggression is defined as “the motivation to harm the other as an end in itself.”66 At this point, there 
is a different kind of discrimination which develops. In other stages, discrimination was based on 
furthering the ingroup; here, discrimination is active and intentional negative behavior against an 
outgroup. However, Brewer points out that when a conflict is perceived to be zero-sum, it is 
difficult to tell if motivations become about ingroup favoritism or outgroup hostility, since the 
resulting actions would likely be similar to one another.  
Based upon ingroup positivity, aggression and inflicting harm of an outgroup is not 
sanctioned in the absence of direct motivation. However, “these are the constraints that are lifted 
when outgroups are viewed with hatred or contempt—emotions that justify outgroup harm above 
and beyond ingroup benefit.”67 From a social identity perspective,  
To justify aggression against outgroups in the interest of the ingroup, the very existence of 
the outgroup, or its goals and values, must be seen as a threat to the maintenance of the 
ingroup and to one's own social identity. Thus, understanding the relationship between 
ingroup identification and outgroup hostility requires understanding how the interests of the 
ingroup and those of the outgroup come to be perceived in conflict.68  
 
That the outgroup is a competitor, different, morally inferior, or any other stereotype, does not lead 
to aggression unless it becomes seen as a threat. This shows an important link between perceived 
                                                          
63 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 25. 
64 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 25. 
65 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 25. 
66 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 26. 
67 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 27. 
68 Brewer, “Ingroup Identification,” 27. 
   
 
 17  
 
threats to the ingroup and hostility toward the outgroup, particularly in the presence of these 
conditions. 
This process of becoming a threat is important. From the perspective of optimal 
distinctiveness theory, there are two possible threats: marginalization from the ingroup and the loss 
of distinctiveness.69 One possible reaction to align oneself with the ingroup in the face of losing 
one’s acceptance is hypervaluation of the group and derogation of outgroups. As Brewer puts it, 
“Threats to inclusion are predicted to heighten feelings of moral superiority, intolerance of 
difference, and concomitant emotions of contempt and disgust toward relevant outgroups.”70 To the 
second threat, Brewer argues that “The social changes that give rise to the prospect of close contact, 
integration, or influence from the outgroup engage the second form of threat to social identity – the 
threat of loss of distinctiveness, accompanied by feelings of invasion.”71 While these two reactions 
to these threats are not inevitable, they are often the case. As Brewer sums up, “This analysis 
suggests that the combined emotions of contempt (engendered by moral superiority in the service of 
insecure identity) and anger (engendered by fear of invasion and loss of distinctiveness) provide the 
potent ingredients that are sufficient to kindle hatred, expulsion, and even ethnic cleansing.”72 
 Brewer’s theory acknowledges that there are moderating conditions that help move groups 
along the spectrum previously outlined. The moderating conditions she identifies are common goals, 
power politics, culture, and social structural complexity.73 Common goals can help or harm. The 
ingroup trust that makes common ingroup goals unifying is absent in the intergroup setting, and can 
make this lack of trust more obvious when groups have to work together. Loss of differentiation is 
also a potential threat, as are any pre-existing dynamics of the intergroup interaction.  
 Power politics is the next mediating condition which Brewer mentions. Brewer writes that 
typical conflict processes as outlined above “may be exacerbated through deliberate manipulation 
by group leaders in the interests of mobilizing collective action to secure or maintain political 
power.”74 Under situations of mistrust, people may fear being under control of those in the outgroup, 
and under such threat, may cling more tightly to the ingroup.  
 Variations among different cultures is another moderating condition. Cultures function 
differently from one another, and any theory which would not take into account the contextual 
nature of any conflict would be inadequate. The distinction Brewer makes is between collectivist 
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and individualist cultures. She suggests that collectivist societies draw sharper lines between groups 
and that there is less trust toward outgroups.75  
 Brewer also lists social structural complexity as an important factor. In highly segmented 
societies, Brewer notes a strong link between intense ingroup favoritism and outgroup antagonism, 
writing that “Such segmentation promotes social comparison and perceptions of conflict of interest 
that give rise to negative attitudes toward outgroups and high potential for conflict.”76 Conversely, 
in societies where social structures are more complex and people are differentiated along many lines, 
people do not categorize as strongly.  Brewer writes that “Such cross-cutting ingroup-outgroup 
distinctions reduce the intensity of the individual’s need for inclusion, thereby reducing the 
potential for polarizing loyalties along any single cleavage or group distinction and perhaps 
increasing tolerance for outgroups in general.”77 From this, we see the importance of complex 
identity structures as a mediating factor.  
While Brewer’s theory is certainly helpful, before I move forward it is worth highlighting 
the effects of salience on intergroup relations and intergroup conflict. Several authors point out that 
a highly salient identity carries with it consequences for how people interact with outgroups and 
shapes how the ingroup/outgroup dynamic is seen.  
In a highly salient social identity, often people subordinate their identity to that of a group, a 
process known as depersonalization. As Kuppens et al put it, “When social identity is salient, 
people undergo a process of depersonalization and see themselves as interchangeable group 
members. If one’s social identity is salient, this would imply that group concerns are also salient, 
giving rise to group-based appraisals and emotions.”78  As a result of this depersonalization, the 
sense of self is closely tied to the ingroup. Depersonalization also applies to the outgroup. Often, the 
outgroup is homogenized and essentialized, and seen as one entity rather than as individuals. Thus, 
if the outgroup is a threat, that the outgroup consists of diverse individuals with varying opinions is 
lost, and all pose a threat.  
People with more salient identities have a higher chance of perceiving negative intentions of 
other groups and seeking out action in retribution for those actions. As Brewer puts it, "Compared 
to ingroupers, outgroupers are less likely to be helped in ambiguous circumstances, more likely to 
be seen as provoking aggression, less likely to receive the benefit of the doubt in attributions for 
negative behaviors, and likely to be seen as less deserving of public welfare."79 These effects are 
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higher in people with more salient identities. Roccas and Elster tell us that "People who strongly 
identify with their group tend to endorse more strongly aggressive policies, are less critical of the 
ingroup's wrongdoings, and are less responsive to interventions designed to reduce 
conflict."80Additionally, they point out that “instead of maintaining a detached attitude that would 
enable them to contain the conflict and seek resolution, highly identified group members are more 
likely to wish for retribution and revenge."81 Through these insights it becomes clear that highly 
salient identities are related to aggressive behavior toward the outgroup.  
Salience is also affected by stressors around people. As people encounter crisis situations, 
the work of Ervin Staub shows that people often turn towards groups in order to fulfill needs that a 
crisis has disrupted. As he puts it, "it is the frustration of basic needs by instigating conditions that 
leads group members, whose individual identity is shaken, to turn to the group for identity, to focus 
more on their social identity, or to 'give themselves over' to an identity group."82 Thus, once in crisis, 
people often latch on to a social identity in a stronger way than they otherwise would. Keeping this 
in mind, it is worth paying attention to any contextual conditions frustrating the basic needs of 
people which are met by connecting with a social identity.  
2.6.2 Social Identity and Conflict Resolution 
It is worth mentioning at this point that any of those possible negative outcomes are 
possibilities, not inevitabilities. Just as the processes that lead to a social identity can lead towards 
greater conflict, they can also be used towards more positive conflict outcomes. To look at how 
insights from social identity theory can be used towards more productive conflict, first, I will say 
more about how a social identity can meet needs positively and not just contribute to conflict. 
Following that, I look at various strategies based on social identity theory that a person might use in 
order to shape systems of conflict towards a more positive and productive conflict.  
The first way I want to point out that a social identity can contribute to a positive outcome is 
through meeting psychological needs positively. As stated above, one of the cognitive functions of 
social identity is meeting needs, and it can do so in a number of ways. As Staub points out, "A good 
social identity – an identity based in a group that is seen in a positive light, for example, as effective 
and powerful – can also be a good source of security, feelings of effectiveness and control, and 
connection."83 These feelings themselves are not negative, nor do they mean negative involvement 
in conflict. Rather, needs can be met positively, and when these needs are met, there is no upsetting 
life changing conditions which push people towards totalizing ideologies. Therefore, as needs are 
met positively, many of the negative possibilities outlined above become less likely.  
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 The common ingroup identity model is one social identity based approach through which 
conflicts may be productively addressed. In this approach, establishing a superordinate identity is 
one proposed way in which social identities can bring different groups under one commonly shared 
ingroup. From this process, theorists argue that if a superordinate group can be established, the 
positive feelings which are normally associated with the ingroup grow to include a previous 
outgroup under this new identity. This theory has been backed up by a great deal of research.  As 
Dovidio et al point out,  
There is considerable evidence, for both laboratory and naturalistic groups, interventions 
that establish a common identity or reinforce an existing shared identity (e.g., national or 
university identity) reduce intergroup threat, increase willingness to exchange information, 
and enhance attentiveness to the needs and perspective of members of another group, now 
included within a superordinate identity.84  
 
Despite this data that is in support of this theory, there are certain limitations which must be kept in 
mind if this approach is to be utilized in a specific context. Brewer points out that “Shared 
superordinate identity must precede or arise concomitant with superordinate goals before positive 
interdependence can be realized.”85 The groups must have a reason to work together in order to 
view each other as non-threatening, similar, and to be willing to give up their respective previously 
held identities.  
 Additionally, the attempt to create a superordinate identity may threaten the need for 
differentiation. Once again looking at Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory, there exists a need 
within groups and individuals for a differentiated identity, and when this is threatened people cling 
to it more tightly rather than giving it up for a superordinate identity. Instead of having the desired 
result, a failed attempt at establishing a superordinate identity can increase intergroup bias and 
tension.86  
The context of the conflict is also important. As Roccas and Elster point out, “When the 
conflict is violent, protracted, and revolving around sacred symbols, people are likely to reject 
strongly a superordinate identity that includes the enemy outgroup.”87 Knowledge of these 
contextual factors can help to indicate whether or not this approach is likely to succeed, or whether 
or not there is an increased likelihood that this will only exacerbate the conflict.   
None of these possible negative outcomes mean that this is always a useless strategy. 
However, it goes to show that this, like any other strategy to alleviate conflict, should be used as 
contextually appropriate, and with a plan rather than just expecting intergroup contact to be a 
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panacea. It is not enough to appeal to a broader identity and ask people who have been in a conflict 
to suddenly get along. There needs to remain a possibility of differentiation, as well as a means to 
positively see the new group. Roccas and Elster write, “To minimize such negative reactions, the 
effective implementation of a common superordinate identity requires simultaneous maintenance of 
the sense of distinctiveness for the ingroup along with the creation of a positive attachment to the 
superordinate identity.”88 However, “When this form of recategorization is successful, ingroup 
loyalties and concern for collective welfare are transferred from the original subgroups to the new 
social category as a whole.”89Thus, this approach requires careful thought and the right context for 
it to be an effective means of transforming conflict.  
 The next social identity based model to consider is the crossed categorization model. It is a 
fact of human cognition that each person carries many different categories with which we identity, 
and this is no different for people who have developed a salient identity. The difference for people 
who have developed a highly salient identity is that one identity has become the defining identity, 
and thus affects all the others. To counter this, the crossed categorization model suggests drawing 
upon the multiple other categories to which a person belongs. As Roccas and Elster put it, “Whereas 
the common ingroup identity model is based on identities linked to embedded categories, the 
crossed categorization model focuses on identities that cut across categories. Thus, multiple 
dimensions of categorization can be accessible and important at the same time.”90 The approach in 
crossed categorization, therefore, is to build affinity for those in an outgroup by finding a group of 
mutual belonging. Rather than creating a new superordinate identity, this is based on categories 
which already exist.   
 This approach is backed up by research. A 2001 study, for example, showed that even 
thinking about multiple categories which one might share with the outgroup would lead to higher 
evaluation of the outgroup.91 However, this approach may work best when the categories are not 
closely related to the identity related to conflict. A crossed categorization approach can reduce bias 
better when the alternate identity is not related to the conflict.92 Additionally, Roccas and Elster tell 
us that  
“Furthermore, similar to the findings from research on the common ingroup identity model, 
identification with one’s initial ingroup inhibits the positive influence of awareness of 
multiple identities on conflict reduction, and making multiple identities salient reduced 
ingroup favoritism for less identified but not for highly identified group members.”93  
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Thus, this perspective is not without flaws, working better for less identified members of a group.  
 Social identity complexity is another social identity approach which can affect conflict in a 
positive way. As defined by Verkuyten and Marinovic, “The concept of social identity complexity 
refers to individual differences in the way in which different group memberships are subjectively 
combined.”94 The more complex the identity structure, the more distinct are the groups to which a 
person belongs; the lower the complexity, the more people assume overlap between multiple 
identities. As Prati et al write, “Studies have shown that those with highly complex identity 
structure give lower importance to conservatism and power values, have higher tolerance for 
diversity, and have low explicit and implicit racial attitudes above and beyond any effects of 
ideology and cognitive style.”95 Verkuyten and Marinovic also write that “low social identity 
complexity means that multiple identities are emedded in a single in-group representation making 
an individual who is an out-group member on one dimension also an out-group member on another 
dimension.”96 They continue,  
Low social identity complexity means that multiple identities are embedded in a single in-
group representation making an individual who is an out-group member on one dimension 
an out-group member on another dimension. This lack of cross-cutting identities increases 
the in-group vs. out-group distinctions and thereby strengthens the distancing from the out-
group members and increases the cognitive bias of in-group bias.97 
 
Through this, we see the positive outcomes of a highly complex identity, as well as the 
consequences of a low social identity complexity.  
This approach to understanding social identity in conflict is related to the crossed 
categorization model. Maykel Verkuyten and Borja Martinovic explain the difference as “While the 
common ingroup identity model and the crossed categorization model focus on patterns of objective 
overlap between multiple identities, the social identity complexity model focuses on the subjective 
representation of the interrelations between multiple identities.”98 
 Another approach to conflict based on social identity theory is increasing social identity 
complexity. As Roccas and Elster tell us, “Greater complexity in representations of social identities 
correlated positively with tolerance toward a variety of outgroups.”99 As such, if an identity is 
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affected by social idnetities, actions which lead towards a more complex social identity structure 
can lead to a reduction in toxic conflict.  
 The decategorization model is a means of deconstructing the category of the other by 
increased contact with the other, and is another social identity based approach towards more 
productive conflict. This specifically seeks, through personal relationships with people in the 
outgroups, to demystify the other and break down stereotypes of the outgroup and decrease social 
identity salience. As Heystone and Greenland summarized it, “The goal then is more interpersonally 
oriented and non-category-based form of responding that allows members ‘to attend to information 
that replaces category identity as the most useful basis for classifying each other.’”100 By taking this 
approach, the goal is to give back a complex understanding of the other as an individual and make 
the category a less meaningful way of representing an outgroup.101 If categorization has a 
homogenizing effect on the outgroup, this approach seeks to diversify the outgroup and through that 
diversity break down stereotypes.  As a result, this weakens the strength of negative stereotypes and 
breaks down harsh boundaries by members developing an interpersonal rather than intergroup 
focus.102  
 This is a distinct approach from the intergroup contact theory, and sets its own unique goals. 
As Brewer puts it, “This perspective on the contact situation suggests that intergroup interactions 
should be structured so as to reduce the salience of category distinctions and to promote 
opportunities to get to know outgroup members as individuals.”103 This approach, as with the others, 
is not without its limits. Once again, issues about differentiation and individuation arise. Reducing 
salience of an identity can be seen as a threat to either of those aspects of human psychology. 
Carried out improperly or in a way that differentiation or individuation are seen as threatened, 
decategorization would be counter-productive and would risk worsening the conflict. 
 The final model I am using through which social identity theory based approaches may be 
applied is intergroup contact theory. Allport’s intergroup contact theory was originally proposed in 
1954, and there has been a great deal of research on it since. The original formulation in 1954 
delineated four features in order for intergroup contact to be successful. Allport required “(1) equal 
status within the contact situation; (2) intergroup cooperation; (3) common goals, and (4) support of 
authorities, law, or custom.”104 Since this original proposal, others have added based on their 
research “opportunities for personal acquaintance between the members” and “intergroup 
                                                          
100 Miles Hewstone and Katy Greenland. “Intergroup Conflict. “International Journal of Psychology, 35(2) 
(2000): 140. 
101 Brewer, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 201. 
102 Esra Cuhadar and Bruce Dayton. “The Social Psychology of Identity and Inter-group Conflict: From 
Theory to Practice." ”International Studies Perspectives 12(2001): 278. 
103 Brewer, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 201 
104 Dovidio et al., 170 
   
 
 24  
 
friendships” as important. Research conducted through the years has supported Allport’s 
formulation. Direct contact has been found to improve outgroup attitudes “by reducing anxiety, 
threat, and negative intergroup emotions and by promoting positive emotions, empathy, 
perspective-taking, and self-disclosure.”105 Additionally, it has been found that “Contact reduces 
prejudice, as well as negative emotions associated with the outgroup, and intergroup threat.”106  
 However, intergroup contact theory is not without its weaknesses. Firstly, most of the 
research conducted on this theory has focused on the timeperiods either before or after violent 
conflict, with little being done on the time period during. In fact, Wagner and Hewsone  point out 
that “If there is already violence between groups, intergroup proximity and contact can contribute to 
its growth, simply because proximity offers increased opportunities to engage in violence against, 
and even kill, members of the outgroup.”107 Additionally, Wagner and Hewstone point out that the 
theory does not fully take into account the way in which minority and majority groups take away 
different things from intergroup contact and have different needs.108 For a full understanding, the 
power dynamics would need to be taken into account.  
Despite these weaknesses, intergroup contact theory still holds a great deal of value. As 
Wagner and Hewstone put it, “Nevertheless, a meta-analytic review of this literature supports the 
conclusion that programs based on the contact hypothesis are effective in reducing prejudice and 
improving intergroup relations even after periods of protracted and sever intergroup violence.”109 
Despite its limitations, it is clear that intergroup contact which meets Allport’s prerequisites can be 
a positive force for alleviating conflict between groups in the right circumstances.   
At this point, I have made the case that a social identity can either contribute to conflicts or 
contribute to a positive peace. Through identifying mediating factors, and possible ways in which 
social identities can contribute towards conflict or peace, I believe I have made it clear that the 
psychological factors that lead to social identity formation are a neutral facet of human cognition. 
Therefore, it is impossible to argue whether they are good or bad, or whether or not social identity 
itself causes conflicts. As Korostelina puts it, “Social identity is neither the cause nor the product of 
conflict. Rather, it should be understood "as a form of consciousness that entirely changes the 
dynamic and structure of conflict"110There is no doubt that a social identity can shape a conflict, in 
the same way that a conflict can shape a social identity. Rather than demonstrate cause, I have 
shown how these mutually informative events can affect each other.  
                                                          
105 Ulrich Wagner and Miles Hewstone, ”Intergroup Contact” in The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict 
ed. Linda R. Tropp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 198. 
106 Wagner and Hewstone, 199. 
107 Wagner and Hewstone, 200.  
108 Wagner and Hewstone, 205. 
109 Wagner and Hewstone, 203 
110 Korostelina, 147 
   
 
 25  
 
3. The Religious Right in the United States 
 Having explored social identity theory and established my theoretical framework, I am 
turning now to the Religious Right in the United States. In looking at the Religious Right, I here set 
out to do several things. First, I will define key terms before moving forward. Secondly, I will give 
a brief history of the connections between conservative religious ideologies and various political 
movements in the United States in the twentieth century. From there, describe the Religious Right 
in terms of social identity theory. After that, I will define the conflict of the Religious Right, and 
then define how the Religious Right functions in this conflict.  
3.1 Definitions 
 Before exploring the history, it is helpful to first clarify much of the terminology 
surrounding the different movements and groups. Due to the lack of clarity in popular usage, when 
speaking about various religious groups in the United States, there are several terms that are 
necessary to define. In this section, I set out to define what I mean by Evangelical, Fundamentalist, 
and the Religious Right. 
Defining Evangelical is a difficult task and largely depends on context. Roger Olson 
identifies six different meanings of Evangelical, ranging from the preferred way of European 
Lutheran Churches to refer to themselves, to the American-centric journalistic shorthand for 
religious fanatic.111 That so many different uses can be found of the word shows the importance of 
context and clarity. To define Evangelical as it relates to this context, I am drawing from David 
Bebbington’s four characteristics which he uses to define Evangelical. These characteristics consist 
of biblicism, conversionism, crucicentrism, and evangelism.112 Biblicism refers to a high view of 
the authority of the Bible, which can include but is not limited to an inerrant view of the Bible. 
Conversionism refers often to a conversion experience, and speaks to the need for repentance. 
Crucicentrism refers to the cross, and the central power of Jesus on the cross for salvation. 
Evangelism speaks to a strong need to preach the gospel to others. While these four categories are 
broad, together, they are a popular way for scholars to speak about Evangelicals in a clear way. 
Moving forward, I intend to use Evangelical specifically to describe religious people or groups 
which display these characteristics.  
It is important to note that Evangelical is often used as a synonym for the Religious Right. 
Many, in fact, may identify themselves as an Evangelical over and above a member of the Religious 
Right. I have, however, chosen to use the term Religious Right because it serves to define more 
clearly the means, motives, and identity of the group, and makes clear that one can be an 
Evangelical without necessarily being a part of the Religious Right. So, while some would identify 
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as an Evangelical, some would identify as a Fundamentalist, and some may prefer a denominational 
identification, I believe the history below will show a clear unification around a certain set of 
theological, political, and ideological goals with which people strongly identify. It is that set of 
unifying beliefs, which in common use goes by many names, which mobilize the group I refer to as 
the Religious Right.   
 The term Fundamentalist suffers from a similar lack of clarity in popular usage as 
Evangelical. As will be expanded upon in the history, I use Fundamentalist to refer to movements 
directly related to the publication of The Fundamentals. While this, in many cases, may overlap 
with Evangelical, it is somewhat distinct and can refer to a variety of things which may not be 
defining for Evangelical circles. For example, The Fundamentals were, among other things, very 
hostile to the Roman Catholic Church – a characteristic which is not shared uniformly within 
present-day Evangelical churches. However, tracing roots to this key work in the early twentieth 
century, anti-Catholic thought may be rightly called Fundamentalist. As such, when I say 
Fundamentalist I am making a connection with a distinct movement of the early 20th century rather 
than using the term generally to refer to conservative religious belief.   
 While I will explore later in greater detail how the Religious Right fits within the framework 
of social identity theory and what defines the group boundaries, I here want to establish a working 
definition moving forward. At the risk of stating the obvious, there are two components which need 
to be defined: the religious component, and the political right component.  
 The religious portion of the Religious Right is difficult to pin down. The history below will 
show that the Religious Right is informed by theological movements across many denominations 
and with varying theological influences; yet out of these varied influences, there is a unifying set of 
issues. There are strong Evangelical and Fundamentalist influences in the Religious Right, though 
the Religious Right is not limited to these groups. As the history below will show, what unifies the 
religious people of the Religious Right is a common set of issues rather than a wholly consistent 
theological agreement.  
 While we might think of the political right portion of the Religious Right as easy to define 
given America’s two party system, it is not so simple. It would be a mistake to equate the Religious 
Right with the Republican Party. From the history presented below, it will be clear that the 
Religious Right is in part a construction of the Republican Party to gain support from what 
President Jimmy Carter showed to be an influential voting bloc. Despite this connection, the 
Religious Right may represent one faction in a It was a movement that “attempts to mobilize 
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Evangelical protestants and other orthodox Christians into conservative political action.”113 In an 
effort to gain support from the conservative religious groups, many within the Republican Party 
took on positions which were against abortion and other social issues in order to mobilize this 
Evangelical voting bloc so political conservatives could carry out the rest of their agenda. 
Politically, this group focuses on social issues, though for many these social or religious issues have 
become connected to economic or other policies.  
 This brings me to my definition of the Religious Right. Historically, it is easy to see that the 
Religious Right is a political development between 1976 and 1980, and is its own unique brand of 
Republican Party politics. Therefore, while I believe it is necessary to acknowledge the movements 
of the twentieth century that have undoubtedly influenced the Religious Right, I want to be clear 
that I am not equating the Religious Right with the movements that predate it, nor am I suggesting 
that it is a direct line from the theological and political movements to the present-day Religious 
Right. As I use the term, the Religious Right refers to a post-Carter alliance between conservative 
Christianity and the Republican Party.  
3.2 A History of Precursors to and Development of the Religious Right 
 Given the scope of my project, a full history of religious and social movements in the United 
States is neither possible to give nor necessary to understand the current state of right-leaning 
religious groups in the United States. However, in order to be able to understand the movement, it is 
necessary to examine key movements that have informed the present state of the Religious Right. In 
order to understand the theological influences, I begin with the Fundamentalist and Evangelical 
movements in the early twentieth century. From there, I will look at post-war political and religious 
developments related to the Religious Right. Following that, I will focus on the 1970’s through the 
decade’s religious issues and the election of Evangelical Jimmy Carter as President of the United 
States. Understanding election years to bring out the clearest political shifts, statements, and 
rhetoric, starting with 1976 and Jimmy Carter’s presidency I will use presidential election years as a 
means of delineating shifts in thought. From there, I focus on the developments of the Religious 
Right movement since its originating in the 1980s. I close with a snapshot of the where the 
Religious Right is as of 2015, and offer some thoughts about the potential consequences of the 2016 
election on the movement and its place in American society.  
 Given this approach, there remains much I have left out, and as such, I feel the need to 
briefly acknowledge some limitations of my history as presented and justify my choices. What I am 
presenting is largely been a history of white, protestant Christianity. Furthermore, I have intended to 
focus on what I believe to be the most influential movements which most closely relate to the 
                                                          
113 Clyde Wilcox and Carin Robinson, Onward Christian SOcliders?: The Religious Right in American Politics 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 8. 
   
 
 28  
 
formation and development of the Religious Right. This eliminates a large number of events, voices, 
and demographics from the story of religious and political movements in twentieth century America. 
I, for example, will not spend much time on the Civil Rights movement, except to point out how 
conservative voices reacted against it. I also do not say much about the Vietnam War, the feminist 
movement, or other key social developments due to my focus on the Religious Right. While the 
Religious Right certainly did not develop in a vacuum where other events and issues were not 
happening, I my history is intended to only highlight the movements in the United States which are 
most important in understanding the Religious Right.  
 Additionally, this history should not be read as if it is a direct line from the Fundamentalists 
to the Religious Right of today; in fact, I would hope the history I have presented would challenge 
such an understanding. While, for example, many are willing to associate the Social Gospel with 
religious liberalism and Fundamentalism with the Christian Right, actors such as William Jennings 
Bryan (discussed below in regards to the Scopes trial) show that the divide between the two is not 
so clear, and the path forward from either of those movements is not destined for only one outcome.  
 Because the paths of these historical movements are not linear as some would suggest, I 
believe this history leads to the conclusion that the Religious Right is something that was 
constructed with some level of intent, rather than the only logical outcome of people’s religious 
beliefs. Additionally, this history shows that the connection of these religious groups with the 
Republican Party was not the only possible outcome. Therefore, rather than seeing the Religious 
Right as the only possible outcome of these conditions, it is important to see that this alliance 
between religious and political conservatives is more a construction than it is a naturally occurring 
alliance.  
 I intend to give a history of a collection of movements, and not just one. However, these 
diverse movements have become intentionally unified by Republican politicians and conservative 
religious leaders into one relatively cohesive movement. Because of this, I think there is a tension in 
what I am trying to do. On the one hand, I want to recognize the diversity of the groups that have 
coalesced into this Religious Right identity, yet by speaking to the diversity, there is a risk of losing 
the sense of cohesiveness of the group that has formed. On the other hand, I do want to recognize 
that this is a cohesive political and religious group; however, I do not want to homogenize these 
diverse groups and oversimplify the those who would identify as part of this group. Therefore, it is 
important to strike a middle ground that simultaneously recognizes the complexity and diversity of 
the Religious Right while at the same time recognizes the unifying themes and issues that both 
politically and religiously unite people into one group which can be spoken of cohesively.  
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3.2.1 The Fundamentals and Christian Fundamentalism  
 While the formation of the Fundamentalist movement may be somewhat distant from us 
today, theological and political aspects apparent in this group are clearly influential to the Religious 
Right today. As Wilcox tells us, “Early in the twentieth century two religious movements – 
fundamentalism and Pentecostalism – emerged that would later provide the major constituencies for 
the Christian Right.”114 In 1910, The Fundamentals was published, which solidified the thoughts of 
several movements into one volume. It was published by “a loose coalition of pietistic revivalist, 
conservative Calivinists, and other evangelicals.”115 Theologically, the work was built on three 
ideas.116 First, the document relies on a premillennialist understanding of the return of Christ. This 
means that The Fundamentals took this specific eschatological understanding of the second coming 
of Jesus, believing that Jesus would come and issue a thousand year reign on earth. Second, The 
Fundamentals takes a dispensationalist approach to scripture. This view of scripture understands 
that there are seven eras of dispensation in which God revealed his rule in scripture.. Third, The 
Fundamentals took a strongly inerrant approach to scripture, understanding the Bible to be without 
flaw or error.  
 In addition to these theological characteristics, Fundamentalists and their leaders were not 
likely to engage in politics. As Mardsen writes, “Although a variety of traditions was represented, 
most of the movement’s leaders in fact expressed relatively little interest in political or social 
issues.”117 Generally speaking, Fundamentalists were often separationists.118 Rather than a strong 
engagement with politics, the primary emphasis was on evangelizing.  
 The Scopes trial was one of the major events, and likely the most important, in which this 
Fundamentalist group gained national visibility. The defendant, John T. Scopes, was a science 
teacher in a Tennessee school, who violated Tennessee state law and taught evolution in his 
classroom. With legal support from the American Civil Liberties Union, Scope’s defense was not 
contesting whether or not he had violated Tennessee state law, but challenged the constitutionality 
of that law. With famed Social Gospel activist and former presidential candidate William Jennings 
Bryan (who would die within a week of the conclusion of the trial) serving as the prosecution, the 
trial became “a public carnival and media circus,” garnering significant national and international 
attention.119 The trial, due to the incredible amount of publicity and media debate, brought the issue 
                                                          
114 Wilcox and Robinson, 31.  
115 Wilcox and Robinson, 32.  
116 Wilcox and Robinson 32. 
117 George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
141. 
118 Wilcox and Robinson, 34 
119 William Martin. With God On Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America.(New York: Broadway 
Books, 1996), 15.  
   
 
 30  
 
of evolution, and more broadly, Fundamentalism, to the forefront. As Marsden puts it, “It would be 
difficult to overestimate the impact of ‘the Monkey Trial’ at Dayton, Tennessee.”120 While the 
prosecution won the immediate case, it was a small victory in a much larger defeat. Within a few 
years, nationwide, all legislation preventing the teaching of evolution in public schools was 
repealed.121   
 As a result of the widely publicized trial, many outside Fundamentalist circles came to view 
the Fundamentalist negatively. According to Marsden “in the trial by public opinion and the press, 
it was clear that the twentieth century, the cities, and the universities had won a resounding victory, 
and that the country, the South, and the Fundamentalists were guilty as charged.”122 Additionally, 
Brown writes of this time period that “Conservative evangelicals were increasingly perceived as 
lacking in ‘tolerance, compromise, and other democratic values,’ a view that was only further 
underscored by the 1925 Scopes trial.”123 As a result, “in the aftermath of the Scopes trial and the 
failure of prohibition, Fundamentalists and other Evangelicals retreated from politics in what has 
been called the ‘great reversal.’”124 The damage to the Fundamentalists’ reputation as movement 
caused several changes. Fundamentalism became associated with small-town Protestantism rather 
than a specific religious movement as it was when it originated. Additionally, the Fundamentalist 
movement was increasingly seen as obscurantist, and would not be able to shake that label.125 While 
Fundamentalism in the early twenties was a nationally influential movement, after the Scopes trial it 
consisted of ‘less flexible and more isolated minorities often retreating into isolationism.”126  
 Reacting to this and other losses of control of not just public but seminary education, the 
Evangelicals spent the 1930s establishing Bible colleges to educate a new generation of 
Fundamentalists. Additionally, they formed numerous radio programs and print publications to 
spread their message.127 Evangelicals withdrew from politics and took to the airwaves, focusing on 
establishing preaching programs on radio across the United States.128 While perhaps in the public 
eye it was though that Fundamentalism was dead, it was indeed far from it. Though the movement 
itself had changed in the twenty years following the publication of the Fundamentals, the network 
of radio and print was established for the next generation of Christian leaders to build from, and 
there still remained a significant population of people sympathetic to the Fundamentalist vision.  
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3.2.2 Post War Religious Movements of the 1950s and 60s 
 In this period, conservative Protestants distanced themselves from some aspects of the 
prewar Fundamentalism. In this time, they “combined an emphasis on Augustinian orthodoxy with 
a positive social program and the desire for renewed cultural and political involvement.”129 Rather 
than the isolationist approach of the Fundamentalists, this aspect of Christian conservativism drove 
those affected by the movement outward into society around them. This movement, while mostly 
theological, was not apolitical, and the theological agenda and political agenda quickly merged. As 
Axel Schafer puts it, “by merging their attack on theological liberalism with the denunciation of 
political liberalism, Evangelical thinkers asserted their claim to political relevance in the wider Cold 
War order.”130  
A related movement of note within conservative Christian circles was the anti-communist 
movement. While these Christians were understandably anti-communist, given how the communists 
opposed religion, this anti-communism spilled over into many political positions, opposing 
Medicare and sex education.131 While, generally speaking, the Christian anti-communist movement 
was not necessarily widely popular, the anti-communist position garnered a deal of sympathy and 
would later bleed over into other issues. For many, this issue connected faith with political action. 
As Martin points out, “Fundamentalist entrepreneurs formed a set of new political organizations to 
take part in the anti-communist movement.”132  This anti-communist platform and how it carried 
into the political realm would inform the political involvement of other groups that would come 
later.  
White Protestantism was in a strong position at the end of the 1950s. As Schafer puts it, “By 
the late 1950’s, white Evangelical Protestants had attained a measure of socio-cultural legitimacy, 
theological authority, internal unity, and political influence that they had not experienced since the 
nineteenth century.”133 One cannot speak of this era without mentioning Billy Graham. Billy 
Graham is a good reflection of this time period within Evangelical Christianity. Graham was 
perhaps the first evangelical superstar, holding many popular gatherings throughout the country. 
Billy Graham’s involvement in politics became influential, and his political involvement is 
significant for what would come later. Graham, because of his influence with so many Americans, 
was given a great deal of access to many political leaders, and was a close acquaintance of Richard 
Nixon.134 Among Graham’s strong stances were the anti-communist stance, which was 
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accompanied closely by a pro-capitalist ideology.135 While Billy Graham was not the only 
conservative leader, he was visibly involved in political debate and trying to connect politicians to 
Christian voters.  
 The 1960s brought a significant shift in American culture, and the conservative religious 
groups were affected just as much by this decade of upheaval within American society. While those 
within the movement might suggest that their beliefs were in opposition to the values of the cultural 
upheaval, Schafer argues the success of conservative religious organizations was built on how well 
it meshed with the culture of the time rather than its opposition to it. Shaffer points out that “the 
counterculture and evangelicalism thus resembled each other in their rhetorical styles, 
organizational patterns, and expressive modes.”136 Additionally, he points out that Evangelicals 
“denounced the secularity and moral relativism, yet thrived upon the appropriation of its 
organizational techniques, expressive modes, and anti-establishment language.” He concludes that 
“Evangelical and fundamentalist churches, rather than being swept away by the waves of 
antitraditionalism and iconoclasm in the sixties, emerged victorious from the upheaval.”137 
 This period also saw a shift in the way in which people related to their denominations. 
While previously they had been distinct, this period saw the growth of ecumenical organizations, 
particularly among religious conservatives. As Schafer writes  
Crucially, this merger of ecumenism and orthodoxy, and the ability to combine a traditional 
message with a modern image, formed the backdrop for Evangelicalism’s success in the 
context of the large-scale socio-economic and demographic changes during and after the 
Second World War.138  
Being able to mix a traditional message across denominational lines strengthened many non-
denominational movements and brought many different voices together in a way that had 
previously not occurred.  
3.2.3 The 1970s, Jimmy Carter, and the Beginning of the Religious Right 
 Several events happened in the 1970s that were crucial to forming what we now understand 
to be the Religious Right. Entering the decade, there was no concept of a unified religious voting 
bloc, yet by the end of the decade, religious conservatives would overwhelmingly unite as an 
influential voting demographic. While I have previously highlighted conservative actors within the 
various movements, it is incorrect to assume that these various religious movements are monolithic 
in their political or theological belief and practices. Although there were elements of conservative 
Christian voters, they were not unified into one party’s system in the way we conceive of it today.   
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 Within this decade, long-term debates within many Christian groups and organizations came 
to a head. Long established Evangelical organizations had, until this point, functioned with a great 
deal of diversity of belief, and there were both liberal and conservative voices within organizations. 
However, in the 1970s, we see the way in which the left failed to organize as a bloc within the 
Evangelical organizations and, as such, lost a voice amidst conservative unity. Schafer writes that 
““With the failure of the evangelical Left to provide a unifying vision, this combination of single-
issue orientation with broad ecumenical engagement, theological orthodoxy, and conservative 
politics came to characterize the approach and appeal of the New Christian Right.”139 Leaders in the 
conservative factions of the party managed to organize, establish themselves in positions of 
leadership, and as such, drive the direction of such organizations. These kinds of internal divides 
show that “In extended battles over issues such as social action, biblical inerrancy, and the virtues 
of capitalism, conservatives managed to marginalize liberal and leftwing impulses.”140 These 
examples are important because it is necessary to point out that quite often these religious 
communities which are now synonymous with conservativism (be it theological or political) quite 
often became so not as a natural result of some inherent connection between religion and right-wing 
politics. Rather, as Schafer tells us, “the Right became dominant on the basis of internal movement 
struggles, rather than simply on the basis of the natural proclivity of evangelicals for rightwing 
politics.” 141 
The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 is a significant turning point in the history of religious 
involvement in politics. Jimmy Carter was a self-proclaimed born-again Christian and a member of 
a Southern Baptist church. In his election, by connecting with evangelicals through his faith and 
shared vocabulary, he managed to take typically Republican areas and turned many votes in his 
favor though he was a Democratic candidate. It was, as Martin points out, among  “conservative 
Christians who were inclined either to vote Republican or to stand clear of the political process 
entirely – on whom Carter’s public acknowledgment of his faith had perhaps the greatest 
impact.”142 Carter, through the use of religious language, was able to capture the votes of and 
mobilize voters who shared his faith. However, just as Carter united this bloc of voters, it very 
quickly turned against him.  
 Several issues arose during the 1970s and shaped Carter’s presidency that are important 
moving forward to understanding the modern Religious Right. Among  these issues were private 
schools, abortion, the equal rights amendment, and the family. The issue of religious schools and 
education is often overlooked in its importance in uniting a movement. After the 1955 Brown v. 
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Board Supreme Court decision which desegregated American schools, many communities founded 
supposedly religious schools with the intention of establishing functionally segregated schools. The 
Lynchburg Christian Academy, founded by Jerry Falwell, is an example of such an institution.143 
As this kind of segregated education continued to be a problem, the Internal Revenue Service 
threatened to take away the tax-exempt status of these religious schools which continued 
discriminatory practices. This aroused the ire of many conservative leaders who saw this as a threat 
to religious liberty or an attack against churches, and mobilized conservative leaders and their 
congregants. The backlash was so severe that the IRS eventually backed down from its threats. 
While many people focus on abortion as a uniting issue, it is worth noting that “Several key figures 
on the Religious Right credit the 1978 IRS/Christian School battle with playing a pivotal role in 
bringing together conservative Christians and creating a genuine politically effective movement.”144 
While this may not be on the minds of Americans today, it is certainly a key historical point within 
the movement, if not the solidifying issue around with fractured religious groups found not only 
unity, but an alliance with the Republican Party.  
 Abortion was another significant issue which became codified in this time period. What is 
interesting was that backlash against this decision was originally primarily Catholic, while 
Evangelicals remained divided on the issue. Martin points out that  
Catholics played the major role in generating the anti-abortion movement spawned by the 
Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe v. Wade decision. By contrast, conservative Protestants seemed 
hardly to recognize it as a major issue. In 1971, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) had 
voted almost unanimously in support of a resolution affirming a woman’s right to have an 
abortion if giving birth would pose physical or emotional danger.145 
 
Despite this initial inaction among Evangelical circles, the initiatives of several key leaders such as  
gave the issue a voice, and in a short time, the Evangelical community was unified against 
abortion.146  
 The Equal Rights Amendment was another unifying issue around with conservative 
protestants came together in opposition. This amendment to the US constitution, which guaranteed 
equality on the basis of sex, passed through both houses of Congress and was sent to the state 
legislatures for ratification (as is the process outlined in the constitution). It is worth pointing out 
that, at this point, there was opposition to the amendment from both parties, yet neither party, in 
principal, could be considered against women’s rights.147 However, a religious and conservative 
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lack of support was tied in with several other issues, few of which had to do with the actual text of 
the amendment. For example, the ERA was by some in conservative groups negatively tied to a 
radical lesbian agenda.148 For others, it was connected with challenging the traditional role of 
women in the family as the homemaker.149 Through this, it appears that opposition to the Equal 
Rights Amendment was part of a larger struggle over a certain understanding of the role of women 
and definitions of family.   
 This brings us to the issue of the family as coded language. While family was a focus of 
Carter’s 1976 campaign, it became something that was used against him later on. Issues mentioned 
previously, such as homosexuality, abortion, women’s rights, and education all became summed up 
under “family values.”150 This shorthand connected a variety of issues which coalesced around one 
understanding of what is family, how to be family, and proper way to raise and care for children.  
 Jimmy Carter’s mobilization of Evangelical protestants made it clear that this group of 
voters was significant, and as these above issues and others grew during his presidency, these newly 
engaged conservative voters began to organize and mobilize around these issues.   As Brooks puts it, 
“Few spoke of a ‘Religious Right’ by the end of 1978, but in retrospect, the battles over the 
previous twenty-four months – the frustrations born of abortion, homosexuality, feminism, and the 
ERA, education and secular humanism, and as always, foreign policy – had laid a strong foundation 
for the movement.”151 Thus we can see in this time period that a combination of internal struggles 
within religious groups in which conservative voices dominated, the collection of these issues, and 
the changing trends of the era all coalesced to lay the ground for a unified movement.   
3.2.4 The 1980s, Ronald Reagan, and the Moral Majority 
 While the 1976 election showed that Evangelical Christian voters could be an influential 
voting bloc, the 1980 election solidified their place in the Republican Party. The 1980 election 
brought together movements outlined in the previous section in which theologically conservative 
groups in large numbers mobilized, organized, and became connected to the platform of the 
Republican Party through the presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan.  
Ronald Reagan was not what the religious community may have expected to be its political 
champion. He was a divorced Hollywood actor, yet Ronald Reagan aggressively courted the 
religious vote. Using key issues such as abortion, education, and other such ‘family values,’ Reagan 
played to those in Evangelical Christian circles. Describing a key speech during 1980  election 
season, Flippin writes that “Reagan had said everything the assembled conservatives wanted to hear, 
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from denouncing abortion and communism to stressing the role of the American family.”152 
Through such advocacy, Reagan earned the support of leaders in circles in the Christian Right, 
becoming “unofficially close.”153 Despite his divorce and other aspects about Reagan’s past that 
would have typically made him unlikeable to born-again Christians, it was clear that “In the end, all 
factors considered, many in the Religious Right were now willing to tolerate personal imperfections 
if the candidate advanced their cause.”154 
 There were several influential religious leaders in this decade which helped to solidify the 
place of the Evangelical voters within the Republican Party. A discussion of this development in 
American history is not complete without looking at Jerry Falwell and his Moral Majority. As 
Falwell defined it, the Moral Majority was “pro-life, pro-family, pro-moral, and pro-American.”155 
While these issues may stem from Christianity, the positions that Falwell and others involved were 
not limited to theological concerns. As Martin puts it, “Jerry Falwell and his cobelligerents may 
have been drawn into politics by issues clearly related to ‘family values’ but they quickly fleshed 
out their platforms to include positions not ordinarily dealt with in Sunday School.”156 This 
Religious Right was influenced by both religious concerns and political concerns, and the line 
between the two was often intentionally blurred. With this new marriage of the political and the 
theological, the Moral Majority opened chapters in 47 states, and through these chapters conducted 
voter registration drives and educational seminars in which the Republican candidates were 
uplifted.157 As one of the originators of the Moral Majority put it, “The key to any kind of political 
impact is to get these people united in some way, so they can see that they are battling the same 
thing and need to be unified.”158 While the unification was a major event in the early 1980s, by the 
end of the decade the Moral Majority was ain decline, and folded in 1986. As Martin puts it, 
“Public opinion polls repeatedly indicated that a substantial majority of the population held negative 
views of Falwell and his organization, no doubt partly because they had been subjected to such an 
intense barrage of scrutiny and criticism.”159 
 The marriage between the Republican Party and the Evangelical Christian movement was a 
political move made by the Republican Party, which in turn leaders in religious communities 
embraced as a means to advance their theological agenda. For the Republicans, this strategy helped 
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separate Christians in the South from their historic support of the Democratic Party.160 In this 
moment, there were two groups who were seeking to use each other to advance their goals. The 
Republican Party wanted to separate the southern Evangelicals from their historically Democratic 
leanings and to expand its base. The leaders in what was becoming the Religious right were looking 
for people in the government to make the changes which they desired – namely those surrounding 
‘family values.’ However, it is clear that this was not and has not been an equal relationship – while 
the Republican Party was successful in using this group to achieve what it wanted from the 
relationship, those in the Religious Right, by and large, have not seen their goals realized though 
their allegiance to the Republican Party remains strong.  
 Ronald Reagan, despite his campaign promises, was not the friend that those in conservative 
religious communities expected him to be. After his election, Reagan quickly tabled his social 
agenda and did not achieve much of what those in the Evangelical community elected him to do, 
disappointing many. As Flippin puts it, “Having arrived in its political Canaan, the Religious Right 
found no paradise but a struggle that in many ways demonstrated the movement’s own limits.”161 
By the 1984 election, those in the new Religious Right who were once proud of their role in 
electing President Reagan were now disappointed in Reagan and his government.162 
 After the goals of the Religious Right found little success under Ronald Regan, Pat 
Robertson decided to run for the presidency in the Republican Primary elections in 1988. Roberson 
was well known in Evangelical circles, and a major part of the Religious Right. Robertson was a 
pioneer of Christian broadcasting, owned a Christian cable network, and hosted  an hour-long 
television show.163 Robertson’s charismatic theology distanced him from Falwell’s Moral Majority, 
though his television network’s inclination for conservativism and his vision of Christian Political 
involvement was similar.164 Robertson focused early efforts in his campaign in Michigan, and 
through some questionable tactics, stacked various positions throughout the state in his favor.165 
However, many did not know him, and the majority of Americans had negative opinions of 
television based evangelists such as Robertson.166  
Pat Robertson’s campaign in the primary elections of 1988 was simultaneously an indication 
of the limitations of the Religious Right as well as the sources of their power. His lack of success 
showed that the Religious Right, on its own, had little chance to win this kind of election However, 
Robertson used his connections from previous voter education efforts to garner a support in a 
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grassroots manner, showing the power of conservative religious networking. Robertson ultimately 
failed to win a state in the primary, though his presence in the election was significant. What he did 
show was the power of the Religious Right in grassroots organizing.167 Additionally, he began the 
trend in which higher percentages of voters in subsequent elections identifying themselves as 
evangelicals.168 For the Republican Party, this was both a success and a failure. On the one hand, 
the Republican Party continued the trend of mobilizing many religious people who previously 
didn’t participate in politics to now vote in their favor. On the other hand, “Pat Robertson’s 1988 
presidential bid not only divided Republicans, it ‘also revealed fissues within the Religious Right 
itself.”169 This reflected a divide in the Republican Party as these new voters joined its ranks.  
3.2.5 1990’s and the Christian Coalition 
 Though the Moral Majority was losing influence at the end of the 1980s, the newly formed 
bloc of religious voters was still a target to mobilize by the Republican Party. If the end of the 
1980’s reflected a conservative turn for the movement, the 1990’s may be thought of as a swing 
back to a more moderate direction. Leading the charge of the next wave was Ralph Reed, who led 
the Christian Coalition. Reed was a veteran of religious conservative groups and was a skilled 
organizer. Started in 1989, the organization quickly grew to being financially secure with 82,000 
members by the fall of 1991.170 Given the failure of Pat Robertson in the 1988 election, and 
subsequently the victory of Bill Clinton over George H.W. Bush, many wondered whether the 
Religious Right had a future. 
 Reed used the dependable tactics that the Religious Right had to this point relied on. As 
Martin describes it, “To generate a response, Reed relied on one of the Christian Right’s most 
dependable ploys: outraging its constituency with sensational accounts of offenses against religion 
and morality committed by homosexuals, liberals, or the government.”171 Through this, the 
Christian Coalition grew with both finances and influence, once again stirring up its base and 
engaging them for political action.  
Despite these tactics, Ralph Reed set out to more broadly include the Religious Right in the 
American political mainstream. As Hart writes, “Reed hoped to portray ‘religious conservatives’ as 
he called them, as moderate, unobjectionable, and completely within the mainstream of American 
politics.”172 Rather than placing the group outside of or morally superior to American politics, Reed 
thought of Christians as rightly occupying space within the American political system. The political 
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stances outlined by Reed and the Christian Coalition were an “effort to repackage the Christian 
Coalition as a moderate voting bloc that would sit squarely within the political mainstream (and, 
coincidentally, make the author a kingmaker.)”173 Theologically, Reed made the case for Christian 
involvement in the American political system as allies of the Republican Party. 174 Through this, we 
can see that Reed represents a significant shift, both theologically and politically. Politically, Reed 
continued to work from within the Republican Party; however, Reed wanted to move the 
conservative religious voice from a position on the periphery toward a central location in the life if 
the Republican Party. As Hart puts it, “If Evangelicals were to be taken seriously, they needed to 
‘do more than rock the obad and panic the establishment.’”175 Theologically, the shift continued 
from isolationism to active involvement in American political life. As such, Reed’s leadership in the 
Christian Coalition represent the changes which took place in the Religious Right in this decade.  
 Throughout the nineties, the issues largely remained the same, with some differences. The 
Conservative Coalition, continuing the anti-abortion stance of the 1980s, also hammered out 
positions which in which the Religious Right began to see itself as a mainstream part of American 
political life and the Republican Party. As Hart describes it, “Reed considered himself and the 
Christian Coalition to be conservative. For him this meant less government, lower taxes, ‘tougher 
laws against crime and drugs, and policies to strengthen the family.’”176 Now, the Religious Right 
as represented by Ralph Reed envisioned itself as a mainstream force in American politics that 
sought to include more voices within the movement. As Dodds points out, “One indication of the 
Religious Right’s greater inclusivity and diversity in the 1990s concerns conservative Catholics, a 
group that had long been a Potential ally of the Religious Right but that had never really been 
brought into the fold.”177 Through greater denominational diversity, a softer stance on some issues 
that made the Religious Right more appealing for moderates, and leadership which was advocating 
for a voice in the mainstream, in this decade the significant shift in the movement was about the 
place of the movement in relation to society.  
3.2.6 George W Bush, Barack Obama, and The Tea Party 
The 2000 election put an Evangelical back in the White House with the victory of George W. 
Bush as president. For many, “At the beginning of the new millennium the Religious Right 
appeared to be a permanent feature of American electoral politics.”178 During the 2000 election, 
George W. Bush, as could be expected, received a great deal of support from the Religious Right 
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and was the first Evangelical to occupy the White House since Jimmy Carter. As Dodds puts it, 
“After Bush was elected, the Religious Right basked in his overtly religious rhetoric and gloried in 
his appointment of the conservative evangelical, Senator John Ashcroft, as Attorney General.”179 
This feeling of success among the Religious Right continued under Bush through the 2004 election, 
though this may be misleading. While some joked after the 2004 election that GOP (an acronym for 
“Grand Old Party” and nickname of the Republican Party) now stood for “God’s Own Party,” as 
Dodds tells us, “While the standard account portrays the Religious Right as being very powerful in 
2004, it may have hit the high-water mark of political power shortly thereafter and then soon 
declined.”180  
While previously the Religious Right existed as a cohesive bloc because Christian 
conservatives united over pressing issues, the 2008 primary cycle showed the divides in the 
movement, and perhaps displayed that the multiple factions of the group which were previously 
unified were now once again divided, and no one candidate emerged as the unifying choice of the 
Religious Right.181 Additionally, another shift occurred in 2008. As Hart writes, 
Rank-and-file evangelicals did vote overwhelmingly for Republicans in 2008, and the 
attraction of ‘tea-party’ candidates for born-again voters in the 2010 midterm contests is 
another apparent indication of an affinity between conservatism and evangelicalism. But 
even while many ordinary evangelicals continue to balk at the Democratic Party and its 
candidates, the evangelical intelligentsia is tracking toward the political Left and away from 
conservative politics and the Republican Party.182 
 
This may be the beginning of a significant shift for the Religious Right, particularly if the 
leadership is changing political directions even if the base is not.  
The 2008 election saw the election of the first Black President of the United States with the 
Election of Barak Obama. And, with a Democrat as president, and Republicans not in control of 
Congress, the Religious Right was once again out of power. For many this was a sign of the 
shrinking power of the Religious Right in American Politics. Though a Christian, Barack Obama’s 
roots in the black church mean his religious background is far from that of the Religious Right.  
The 2010 midterms raise an interesing question about the place of the Religious Right 
within the Republican Party, namely, its relationship with the Tea Party. During this 2010 off-year 
election cycle, the Tea Party emerged as a new political faction of the Republican Party, winning 
several seats in Congress. While some draw a clear distinction between the two, others see the 
overlap between the Tea Party faction of the Republican Party and the Religious Right. On the one 
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hand, the Tea Party is largely libertarian and focused on economic rather than social issues. 183 On 
the other, many are willing to see overlap, and as Dodds puts  it, “Insofar as the two groups are, 
indeed, similar, the Religious Right may now enjoy many of the benefits of political power while 
largely avoiding the media spotlight.”184 Regardless of the connection between the Tea Party and 
the Religious Right, it appeared as of 2010 that the Religious Right was shrinking. Wilcox and 
Robinson point out that “Most Christian Right organizations are weaker in 2010 than they were in 
2000, with fewer members, state chapters, and activists.”185 While conservative organizations, such 
as the Moral Majority, had come and gone, that membership was down across all organizations was 
a sign for many that this group was running out of people and influence.  
3.2.7 The Religious Right as of 2015 
 As pointed out previously, the key issues of the Religious Right have remained relatively 
unchanged since the movement first coalesced in the 1970s. Abortion, gay marriage, school choice, 
and other issues all still motivate and encourage religious conservatives to turn out and vote for the 
Republican Party. While the relative strength of this religious movement has ebbed and flowed, it 
has remained a constant voice within American politics since 1980. As of 2015, the Religious Right 
is still unified around the issues which arose during the Carter administration.186 It has maintained 
its strategy of influencing through working within the Republican Party rather than trying to 
influence both parties.187 In addition to keeping its policy and approach the same since the 1980 
election, its target audience has remained the same. As Wilcox and Robinson point out, “Most 
analysts agree that the principle target audience of the Christian Right remains the white evangelical 
community, especially the Fundamentalist and Pentecostal wings. But the contemporary Christian 
Right is also targeting conservative Catholics, mainline protestants, and African Americans.”188 
While the movement has attempted to appeal to more ream may have spread a bit, the primary 
target audience has remained the same.  
 Though these issues and approaches have remained the same, because of the shift of the 
1990s, the Religious Right envisions itself in the mainstream rather than on the fringe. And, as 
Dodds theorizes, one possible reason the movement may appear to be shrinking is due to the fact 
that much of its functions have been taken over by the Republican Party itself. He suggests that the 
Religious Right may be less visible because many of its actions and functions have now been taken 
over by the Republican Party itself.189 Over the years, the Religious Right has certainly shifted the 
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platform of the Republican Party and changed the way Republican candidates talk about the issues 
important to the Religious Right.  
 Despite overarching consistency in its aims over several decades, the Religious Right has 
not brought much change at the policy level. Dodds tells us that “The view that the Religious 
Right’s efforts to change policy have met with failure is widely shared by academics and members 
of the Religious Right itself, if not also by the general public.”190 If anything, the Religious Right 
has watched policy move in the opposite of its desired directions. However, the goals of the 
Religious Right are still very political and seek to reverse the advances made in, for example, areas 
of women’s health and LGBT rights. As Martin points out, “Like all other major political 
movements, the Religious Right seeks to control, or at least to exert strong influence over the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the United States government.”191 While the 
theological influences serve to highlight certain issues, it is worth noting the inherently political 
goals of the movement, despite its lack of success.  
 It is also worth pointing out throughout this history is much of what unifies the Religious 
Right is its desire to fight certain issues. Whether this was the original unification around the IRS 
challenge to Christian segregation academies, or the fight in the courts against marriage rights for 
LGBT people, this history thematically reveals the unification through opposition. At times, as 
capitalized on by Ralph Reed, this has been an intentional strategy of the Religious Right.   
 As of this writing, Donald Trump is the recently inaugurated president of the United States. 
His divisive campaign was a clear deviation from the mainstream Republican Party as it has existed 
since George W. Bush. However, results show that he clearly had significant support among 
Evangelical Christians. The initial weeks of the Trump presidency have been chaotic, divisive, and 
seem to indicate that the United States are headed into a way of doing politics that is unfamiliar. It 
is quite possible that his presidency will lead to a shift in how the Religious Right is empowered or 
acts within the American Political system. While I will not speak to the ways in which I think this 
will change the movement, particularly since such speculation has through this election proven to 
be inaccurate, it is necessary to mention that what this thesis may reveal about the Religious Right 
may very well be at a moment of transition and my conclusions may require further adjustment in 
the situations that emerge as a result of the Trump presidency.  
3.3 The Religious Right as a Social Identity  
 Having established a history of the Religious Right and clarifying my vocabulary, it is now 
possible to explore the Religious Right under social identity theory. As I believe my history has 
shown, the Religious Right is best understood as an umbrella term for a myriad of subgroups. 
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However, because there is a common identity formed under this umbrella term, it is possible to 
speak of unity within these groups. While one of the difficulties I discussed above is the contested 
use of language around terms such as Evangelical, Fundamentalist, Religious Right, and other such 
language, I hope to be clear in my own language in order to describe what is going on. As 
previously stated, I am measuring social identity through three factors. First, I will identify the 
characteristics of those within the group. Secondly, I will focus on the content of the social identity, 
understood to be the normative behavior, expectations, and values. Lastly, I will focus on the 
salience.  
 The characteristics of a social identity, as previously stated, are the defining features of a 
group. As this relates to the Religious Right, there are sever implicit defining features which make 
one part of the group. First, there is a religious component, often with Evangelical or 
Fundamentalist influences. Usually, this is a Christian belief of some kind.  Secondly, these 
religious beliefs are manifested around the specific list of issues which the Religious Right has 
unified around as being important. These issues center around family values, and include key issues 
such as abortion and LGBT rights. Politically, being aligned with the Republican Party is another 
marker. This moves beyond theological issues, and brings up issues such as personal responsibility 
and individualism. As the history presented above shows, these are the defining characteristics of 
the Religious Right.  
Considering the Religious Right as a social identity, it is also important to look at the 
content of the identity. As I defined it previously, the content of a social identity consists of 
normative behavior, beliefs, and values. While these three things may overlap in some ways, I think 
it is helpful to keep these categories distinct for the purposes of outlining the content of this social 
identity.  
 There are several behaviors which make up the normative behavior of the Religious Right. 
Political engagement is a part of the normative behavior of the Religious Right. As has been a major 
purpose since its creation, the Religious Right served to mobilize people in favor of Republican 
candidates who carry out the . While not everyone in the Religious Right will become part of an 
organization like the Moral Majority, Christian Coalition, or or another similar group, the normative 
behavior, in large part, is supporting and voting for candidates who support key issues. Related to 
this unification around key issues, it appears that principled opposition of some kind is another 
normative behavior of the Religious Right. While there are many ways this manifests, it appears 
that some action steps taken, either towards protecting what is valuable or dismantling what is evil, 
are another kind of normative behavior. Often, this may simply take the form of speaking against 
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something or voting. Regardless, this notion of a principled stand seems to be thematic in the 
Religious Right’s opposition to certain issues.  
 Because of the religious beliefs, there is a normative moral code closely related to the ethical 
code of White Christian Protestantism. While many politicians have eschewed this kind of behavior, 
there appear to be a certain moral code around the defining values which, together, outline the 
normative behavior of the Religious Right. Certain actions, such as divorce, are merely frowned 
upon. Other actions, such as homosexual behavior or abortion, are strictly taboo. While it is perhaps 
beyond the scope of this project to fully deconstruct the moral code through which the Religious 
Right acts, it is worth noting that there does indeed exist a moral code based on conservative 
Christian belief and practice, mostly centered around the coded language family values. 
The next two aspects of content of the Religious Right I am looking at are beliefs and values, 
and it is necessary to distinguish the two. Simply put, beliefs, as I am here using the term, are 
understandings of how the world does or should work. Values, on the other hand, provide 
statements of worth, and define what is most important. While perhaps this is most obvious, one of 
the unifying beliefs of the Religious Right is a belief in a certain form of Christianity. Usually, 
though not exclusively, this has been built on a conservative kind of Protestantism, which as shown, 
has been influenced by Fundamentalism and/or Evangelicalism. Though there are certainly 
Catholics, mainline-protestants, and even some non-Christians who would fall within this group, 
they themselves often display traits of being influenced by these 20th century Christian movements.  
One of the clearest beliefs of the Religious Right is encapsulated in its umbrella term of 
family values. This is coded language not simply for being pro-family, but contains a certain view 
of what a family should be, how family members should act, and who is allowed and not allowed to 
be defined as a family. This language relates to issues of pre-marital sex and sex education in public 
schools, homosexuality and same-sex marriage, pro-life policies, single-parent households, and 
more. This broad-based belief which covers a variety of issues is a way in which those in the 
Religious Right is not simply for families, but is for a certain kind of family.  
 Turning to the values, in addition to the definition presented above, I understand values to 
be things which a person or group sees positively; thus, while negative emotions may arise out of 
how these values are expressed, I understand these values to be understood positively by those who 
hold them. Though perhaps obvious, it is worth pointing out that the Religious Right values its 
religious beliefs and ability to practice its religion as it wishes. The Evangelical and Fundamentalist 
influences which carry into political opinions are important for this group to be able to express. 
Issues of expressions of faith – such as prayer or religious teachings in schools –prove time and 
again to hold great worth for the Religious Right.  
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 Family is another key value of those in the Religious Right. As pointed out above, there are 
specific normative beliefs of what a family is and consists of. This specific understanding of family, 
however, proves time and again to be something the Religious Right values highly. The political 
battle over definitions of marriage, for example, show how ideas of family that are not within the 
bounds of their normative beliefs  are to be publicly challenged.  
 The Religious Right also values individual responsibility. This is both a theological and a 
political concern. As pointed out in the history of the group, it is clear the politics and theology have 
merged on this issue. As Schafer puts it,  
By elevating choice, individual sovereignty, and free enterprise, evangelicalism provided 
spiritual sanctioning for business success and translated it into a religious drama in which 
the awakening constituted a relegitimization of the core myths of the American way of 
life.192 
 
Combining the theological import of individual choice and action with the economic and political 
structures of the United States, as such, has led individual responsibility to become a normative 
value of the Religious Right. Expressed through a wide variety of positions, this value gives shape 
to religious and political life of those in the Religious Right.  
 The third facet of measuring a social identity is salience. Salience has a significant  impact 
on the effects of one’s social identity, and is an important feature to take into consideration. As 
previously defined, a salient identity is the most important identity for a person. Measured from low 
salience to high salience, it can be understood as the level at which one identifies with a social 
identity.  
As it relates to social identity theory, I have so far shown that there exists a category with 
which people identify that I call the Religious Right. While salience is an individual measure and 
cannot be applied to a group outright, these factors which increase salience are important to 
remember in both assessing the state of conflict between the Religious Right and other groups. 
Particularly for individuals and groups for whom salience appears high, these determinants of 
salience are necessary to take into account in order to productively move conflict in a productive 
direction. 
 Before looking at the salience of the identity within the Religious Right, I want to highlight 
once again some key consequences of a salient identity. A highly salient social identity means 
boundaries are drawn more sharply, leads a person to value their ingroup as superior, and leads to 
ingroup goals carrying more weight than individual identity. Drawing once again from 
Korostelina’s work, there are three determinants of salience: level of difference, prevalence of 
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intergroup contact, and competition between groups, each of which carries an impact on the 
salience of a social identity.  
 Levels of difference between groups are one determinant of salience. As pointed out 
previously, Korostelina tells us that higher levels of difference lead to a more salient identity. 
Between the Religious Right and those who it sees as the outsiders, there can be a significant level 
of difference between those within the Religious Right and those not considered to be a part of the 
ingroup. While it is important to point out that the level to which people within the Religious Right 
will understand themselves to be different may vary, in the way the dialogue is presented from the 
leadership of the movement, it is clear that leaders such as Jerry Falwell and Ralph Reed envision a 
large difference between the Religious Right and those who it opposes.   
 The prevalence of intergroup contact is another determinant of salience. As cited previously, 
the more people interact with others as typical outgroup members, the more salient an identity will 
become.  As pointed out in the characteristics of the Religious Right, it does not have the same 
external markers that a social identity based on race, ethnicity, or language might.  As such, 
intergroup contact is not always directly visible unless disagreements over the identifying beliefs 
come up. However, it may be worth considering what role the media may play in presenting the 
other as the prototype. If contact in person is limited or not visible, portrayals through the media 
become increasingly important as those interactions define what is typical.  
 Competition between groups is another determinant of salience. Korostolina, as cited 
previously, tells us that the more competition between groups, the more salient identities will 
become. Given the competitive nature of the political goals of the Religious Right, it is clear that 
there are high levels of competition. In order for ‘family values’ to be recognized in the way that the 
Religious Right wants, others have to lose out on their goals. If marriage has the legal definition 
that the Religious Right wants it to have, then gay and lesbian couples cannot have their 
relationships recognized by the government. The goals of the Religious Right are not simply to 
govern their own behavior, but at times to influence the behavior of others through legislation. Thus, 
this competitive nature of the Religious Right’s positions may very well serve to raise the salience 
of social identity in those who embrace the Religious Right as a part of their identity.  
 While salience can vary from person to person, it is worth understanding how these 
determinants of salience may increase the salience of those identifying with the Religious Right. 
Each of these factors is clearly at work within the Religious Right. While it is impossible to 
understand how each of these determinants play out in every individual case, if someone wishes to 
work with those in the Religious Right, it is beneficial to understand how these factors shape the 
social identity and may enhance features of it.  To recognize that difference, stereotype based 
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intergroup contact, and competition increase the salience of the identity is to understand how these 
may negatively affect conflicts of which the Religious Right is a part.  
3.4 Defining the Conflict 
 Having established a closer look at the Religious Right as a social identity, it is necessary to 
define the conflict which I argue the Religious Right is involved in and identify the characteristics 
of said conflict. Here, I set out to define what kind of conflict I believe this is. Next, I point out 
underlying issues of systemic violence within the conflict, and briefly summarize the opponent in 
the Religious Right’s understanding. I then, building from Marilynn Brewer’s continuum, show 
how the Religious Right may present in the midst of conflict along this spectrum.  
 I argue that this is a protracted, identity-based conflict. As pointed out previously, the longer 
conflicts go on, the more conflicts become centered on more abstract concepts such as moral 
superiority or values. Because the Religious Right has now for forty years been an organized group 
that has seen itself in conflict with others, this insight is important. Rather than mere political 
disagreements, because the conflict has lasted for such a long time, moral superiority and 
contrasting values have taken precedence over the presenting issues. While the original issues have 
not entirely changed – for example, family values language is still used – the entrenched nature of 
these issues has become significant.   
 While as the history presented shows there were clear dividing issues of policy, this conflict 
has now turned into a conflict heavily influenced by identities. To understand oneself as part of the 
Religious Right means to understand oneself as involved in the struggles of the group. These 
struggles to reach religiously motivated political ends have lasted for decades, and people in young 
adulthood have grown up understanding the conflict between the Religious Right and its political 
opponents to be a part of their life-long reality. As such, this protracted conflict is a part of identity, 
and carries on not just because of the original dividing issues.   
3.4.1 Issues of Violence in the conflict with the Religious Right 
 I also argue that there are issues of violence at play in the conflicts of which the Religious 
Right is a part. Johan Galtung points out that there are multiple ways in which a conflict may turn 
violent, in that there are different kinds of violence. Except for extremely rare isolated incidents, 
this conflict is not characterized by issues of direct violence. However, as defined previously, there 
are issues of structural and cultural violence at play. An important distinction needs to be made. 
Those in the Religious Right understand their political positions to be based on improving the 
situation for themselves and those around them. Apart from extreme outliers, its motives are to 
make the world better as the Religious Right understands it, rather than making those around them 
worse - though the outcome may be different than this intent. Though there have been incredibly 
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rare instances of violence (such as religiously motivated attacks on abortion clinics), it is improper 
to let the extreme define the norm.  
 While the Religious Right often sees itself as the victim, in many instances it makes more 
sense to see it as the aggressor in structural conflict. Because of its position in the Republican Party, 
it carries with it some cultural power as well as political power insofar as the Religious Right is able 
to shape the platform of the Republican Party and influence its policy. Though the Religious Right 
has often been hampered in its abilities to carry out policies, the positions it takes, in totality, often 
contribute to systemic conflicts larger than the Religious Right.  As pointed out, many of its policies 
reflect its history of racism, sexism, and homophobia. For example, Schafer writes that  
The conservative attack on the welfare state for allegedly generating dependency and 
encouraging moral iniquity exemplified this strategy. Since the claim that a lack of 
economic independence translates into the absence of moral self-control had traditionally 
been used to denigrate blacks and females, conservatives reasserted established race and 
gender stereotypes via an attack on the beneficiaries of supposedly overgenerous public 
assistance – namely African Americans and women… This can be interpreted as a coded 
reassertion of race and gender divisions.193 
 
As such these kinds of language and policies, regardless of intent, can contribute to such racist or 
sexist structural inequalities.  
While the movement may envision itself embattled over the soul of America, the life or 
death consequences of its policies and actions cannot be overlooked. While this conflict may be 
glossed over as political disagreements, I would argue that the significant and negative impact the 
identity-based positions of the Religious Right warrant understanding these disagreements as an 
active conflict between the Religious Right and those it opposes. For example, as outlined above, 
the harsh anti-abortion policies the Religious Right would wish to impart would have significant 
health impacts for many women across the United States. Or, the anti-welfare approach (as held by 
people like Ralph Reed) come with significant negative outcomes for people who need such 
programs. While it appears that many hold such political positions with integrity, it would be 
irresponsible to ignore the real and severe consequences if such policies were to go into place.  
 To this point, I have solely focused on the Religious Right and its perspective, without 
identifying who it is in conflict with. This has been intentional; the construction of the other is more 
a creation of ingroup thinking than it is based in an unbiased understanding of the world. As such, I 
am focusing on how the Religious Right understands its opponent(s) rather than an objective 
analysis of who the ‘other’ is within this conflict.  
 There is not just one group the Religious Right understands itself to be in conflict with, nor 
are there simply few issues. However, under the umbrella term of family values, the Religious Right 
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is able to stake its position in opposition to homosexuals, feminists, pro-choice groups, and more. 
The conflict in this case is understood to be against those who are threatening the American family 
structure as the Religious Right sees it. As such, it appears one of the significant ways that the other 
is defined is through this threat to family values.   
 Perhaps obvious from the political nature of the Religious Right, the political left is a clear 
other in the language of the Religious Right. Insofar as the left is working to counter the goals of the 
Religious Right, they exist in direct political opposition. The left is what stands between the 
Religious Right and realizing their goals politically. Additionally, often the left is portrayed as 
against the religious goals of the Religious Right as well, insofar as they are separate from the 
political goals.  
3.4.2 Spectrum of the Religious Right Social Identity in Conflict 
 As pointed out previously, the level at which people identify with the Religious Right will 
vary. In addition to those variances in level of identification, people in this conflict will present at 
different places on Brewer’s spectrum within the conflict. To move forward towards a healthier way 
to engage conflict, it is helpful, if not necessary, to identify how people may fall along this 
continuum in order to productively engage and work with people.  As such, I hope to in brief 
demonstrate how this intergroup conflict may present among the various positions of Brewer’s 
continuum.   
Positivity for the ingroup is near the low side of Brewers spectrum. As previously stated in 
earlier sections of this work, positivity for the ingroup, while not inherently concerned with 
negative feelings towards the outgroup, can result in asymmetrical treatment based on ingroup or 
outgroup classification. Particularly if one group has more access to power or resources, 
asymmetrical benefits will occur if distribution is affected by favoritism towards one group. 
Regardless of the consequences, this point on the continuum is defined simply by positive feelings 
toward the ingroup. Looking at the history of the Religious Right, there are certainly instances 
where we can see this favorable treatment at work. Politicians such as Ronald Reagan and Donald 
Trump have been given a pass on personal moral failures because they have aligned themselves 
with the Religious Right. By voting for others who espouse the beliefs of the Religious Right, by 
favoring Religious Right beliefs through policies, and through other actions, at this stage it is easy 
to see how those in the Religious Right would live out positivity for the ingroup.  
 Ingroup comparison is the next position in Brewer’s spectrum. Similar to ingroup positivity, 
intergroup comparison is not necessarily a negative or conflict-enhancing proposition. However, as 
pointed out previously, often this kind of comparison can turn into a competitive proposition with 
the evaluative shift from “we are good” to “we are better.” Framed in this way, comparing one’s 
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group with another becomes a competition in which a positive view of the ingroup only comes at 
the expense of the outgroup.  
 With the Religious Right, it seems clear that much of its thought have drifted into win-lose 
propositions in which for the Religious Right to feel successful, its opponents must be doing poorly. 
In the key issues of the Religious Right, the positions as described in the history above are clearly a 
zero-sum proposition. The way in which the Religious Right views homosexuality and same-sex 
marriage is a great example of how this kind of comparison takes place. It is apparent that marriages 
between people of the same sex are viewed as less legitimate than those of heterosexual couples. 
While this kind of comparison may be benign, it is apparent through the history of legal, moral, and 
social challenges the Religious Right clearly views itself as better. If a person or group of the 
Religious Right is at this point on the continuum, it may be the case that a positive view of oneself 
may only come at the expense of the outgroup – whether that be on the issue of homosexuality or 
another issue.   
 Outgroup hostility is the final point on Brewer’s spectrum. It is at this point in the spectrum 
which competition turns into aggression and hurting the outgroup becomes an end unto itself. At 
this point, discrimination is now intentional and not a byproduct of ingroup favoritism. Additionally, 
such aggression typically comes from an understanding that the ingroup and its goals and values are 
under an existential threat. Therefore, to act aggressively against an outgroup may come from a 
desire to protect the ingroup. As previously highlighted from Brewer’s research, contempt from a 
position of moral superiority and anger based on fear are the driving forces “that are sufficient to 
kindle hatred, expulsion, and even ethnic cleansing.”194  
 While I do not want to suggest that outgroup hostility is necessarily normative within the 
Religious Right, it is certainly present among some who identify with the group. Aware of how the 
nature of protracted conflicts moves people toward this kind of behavior, it makes sense to see this 
kind of position coming from some in the Religious Right. Also, as pointed out previously, when 
conflict is perceived to be zero-sum (as it may be in the intergroup comparison stage) it is difficult 
to tell whether the motive is to help the ingroup or harm the outgroup. Paying attention to Brewer’s 
two key emotions - contempt based on moral superiority and a fear-driven anger -  the rhetoric of 
the Religious Right has, since its inception, played to these in order to stir up its base and inspire 
people towards action.  
 An example of how such outgroup hostility plays out in the current positions of the 
Religious Right is the current ongoing debate on immigration from Muslim based countries. As of 
this writing, there is currently an extended battle over issuing travel visas to people from six 
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Muslim-majority countries, citing security concerns. While not overt, I believe that this comes from 
an implicit devaluation of Muslims as morally inferior and associating Islam with terrorism. Thus, 
in one such position, it is clear that we see both building blocks of moral superiority leading to 
contempt and anger engendered by fear. While I do not want to directly equate the politics of 
Donald Trump and the positions of the Religious Right, insofar as Donald Trump has the support of 
White Evangelicals on this issue, these positions may reflect a way in which hostility has become 
an end unto itself for some within the Religious Right.195  
 It would be incorrect and irresponsible for me to characterize all within the Religious Right 
as motivated by aggression towards the outgroup. However, given the examples and the history of 
the movement, it is clear the building blocks of such aggression are present within the group, and 
given the competitive nature of the group’s positions, it is often a blurry line as to whether the 
motivations are based on intergroup comparison or outgroup hostility. I also want to point out that, 
disregarding the most extreme outliers, while those within the Religious Right may exhibit these 
traits, there is little open hostility or direct violence. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of 
hostility in terms of systemic or cultural issues than it is to speak of direct violence.  
 The Religious Right does not exist in a vacuum, and the presence of some moderating 
conditions mentioned previously play a role in how the Religious Right functions in conflict. The 
history above shows the most important mediating mentioned previously to be the presence of 
power politics in the US system. This affects how the Religious Right perceives itself – either as 
being in power or being out of power. Because it is useful, I will quote Brewer again. She writes, 
“When trust is ingroup-based, it is easy to fear control by outsiders; perceived common threat from 
outgroups increases ingroup cohesion and loyalty; appeals to ingroup interests have grater 
legitimacy than appeals to personal self-interest.”196 For the situation of the Religious Right in the 
United States, it is quite possible that control by others may be threatening, particularly if the 
conflict is perceived in a zero-sum nature and control by others represents the frustration of one’s 
own values.  
4. Possible Ways Toward More Productive Conflict 
 As stated previously, I believe a focus on resolution as it relates to conflict gives a 
misleading image of what is possible. The goal of working in conflict, as I outlined previously, is 
changing the system in which negative or toxic conflict occurs into one in which more positive 
conflict outcomes can occur. In this chapter, based on the previously presented approaches based on 
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social identity theory, I go through the various approaches through which social identity theory can 
contribute to positive conflict outcomes and apply the theory to the religious right. Next, I add to 
these findings by addressing the approaches in totality, and draw from the overall themes to reach 
more recommendations for working with the Religious Right.  
 There are several models through which social identity theory can be applied and potentially 
help groups move past difficult conflicts. The common ingroup identity model, recategorization, the 
crossed categorization model, social identity complexity, decategorization, and intergroup contact 
the theoretical approaches based on social identity theory I previously highlighted. Now, with an 
understanding of the social identity of the Religious Right, its history, and the factors which 
influence its present conflict(s), we are now able to explore the usefulness of these theories in 
providing a way forward towards productive conflict. Understanding that no one theory can provide 
a universal or perfect solution, I will apply each theory to the conflicts of the Religious Right. To do 
so, I will go through the various models by first briefly summarizing the approach each model takes, 
then providing one possible way in which each theory might be applied to the Religious Right. My 
applications are not intended to be thorough or complete; rather, they serve as one possible way 
which they may be applied to the conflicts of the Religious Right and as a demonstration of how 
each model may be valuable to overcoming such conflicts. I end my examination of each model 
with a suggestion of which point on Brewer’s continuum each approach may be most effective.  
 The common ingroup identity model involves establishing a superordinate identity and 
working toward superordinate goals. This kind of approach has been shown to reduce the sense of 
threat from other identities and increase the willingness of both sides to work together. One concern 
that this approach brings is that it may threaten the need for differentiation, and in doing so, may 
increase intergroup bias and tension.   
As this relates to the Religious Right and its conflicts, possible ways forward building on 
this approach would involve bringing about an identity which can include both the Religious Right 
and those it sees as its opponents in conflict. Additionally, it should include the ability to work 
towards superordinate goals. However, given that the Religious Right has been something with 
which people identify for almost forty years, care should be taken to ensure that the new common 
ingroup identity does not threaten the identity of the Religious Right or contribute to a sense of loss 
of differentiation.  
A possibility may exist here in developing a superordinate identity around “family values.” 
While some in the Religious Right have suggested otherwise, there are likely few people in the 
United States who are against families. What the Religious Right has done is to take this value of 
the family and taken a very narrow definition of family values and the proper actions to be 
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supportive of them. While it would be unreasonable for everyone to agree on an approach, there are 
quite possibly ways in which, by focusing on the values, the Religious Right may find common 
ground with those with whom it is in conflict. Through this shared superordinate identity, it could 
be possible to find shared goals to work towards.  
Looking at the different points on Brewer’s continuum, it appears likely that this approach 
would be most effective in the stages of positivity for the ingroup and intergroup comparison. 
Particularly in the positivity for the ingroup stage, it would be easier to expand the outgroup. In 
intergroup comparison, this approach may be more challenging, particularly if the outgroup is one 
of the groups against which success is measured. While the need may still exist to define one’s self 
and ingroup as better than the outgroup, a superordinate identity which creates a common ingroup 
may serve to include those who were previously marginalized.  
 The crossed categorization model focuses on identities which cut across many categories. 
Rather than focusing on a creating a new superordinate identity, this model draws on pre-existing 
identities and encourages people to identify and build on identity categories which they share. One 
possible limitation of this is appealing to identity categories which are closely related to the identity 
in conflict. If the common identities to which one is appealing are closely related to the conflict, it is 
less likely that this approach will be successful. Additionally, previously cited research has found 
that this approach is less effective for those who are highly identified with the initial group.  
As this approach relates to those in the Religious Right, there are many possible inroads 
through which people might find a common shared identity with those in the Religious Right. 
Shared identities around national origin, common religion, or common interests all may be shared 
with those within the movement. While the Religious Right, in many cases, uses these same 
categories to exclude, by identifying common shared identity through these categories there exists a 
possibility of utilizing crossed categorization.  
One caution with the Religious Right is that common identities around religion may not be 
the most effective considering the closeness of religious identity to the issues in conflict with the 
Religious Right. As presented earlier, appealing to identities which are closer to the identity in 
conflict are more likely to backfire. The closer an identity is to the identity in conflict, the more 
likely it is to be understood as a threat or in competition. Therefore, with those who are highly 
identified with the Religious Right, such an approach may backfire if the crossed-categorization 
attempt is based on an identity that is closely related to the core values of the Religious Right. As 
with the common ingroup identity model, this approach is likely best on the ends of the continuum 
away from hostility. If hostility towards the outgroup is already a means to the end, this approach 
seems more likely to backfire given the highly identified nature of those in the conflict.  
   
 
 54  
 
 The social identity complexity model is built on increasing the complexity of understanding 
around large groups of people. A higher social identity complexity is correlated with higher levels 
of tolerance towards out groups. Those with lower social identity complexity tend to homogenize 
outgroups, see less distinction, and display lower levels of tolerance. For those with low social 
identity complexity, if a person is in the outgroup in one aspect of the social identity, they are 
understood to be entirely in the outgroup. As pointed out previously, this approach deals with the 
subjective evaluation of outgroups rather than objective understandings of content or conflict with 
the outgroup.  
 When put in conversation with what we know about the Religious Right and social identity, 
this offers a less clear path forward. While insights about social identity complexity point out that 
individuals holding a more complex identity structure are more tolerant of diversity and are less 
likely to homogenize large groups of people, the way to achieve a more complex identity is perhaps 
less clear, particularly in conflict. As cited previously, conflict tends to lower social identity 
complexity. While a more complex understanding of outside identities is linked to lowering conflict, 
it appears that this may be more successful as a preventative measure rather than in the midst of 
conflict.  
 As stated previously, decategorization is a means of deconstructing the category of the other 
through increased contact and developing meaningful personal relationships with those in the 
outgroup. Through this, there is a decrease in the salience of social identity. This approach lowers 
the category-based understanding of the outgroup and establishes interpersonal definitions of the 
outgroup. As with other approaches, problems may arise using this approach if a person’s need for 
differentiation is threatened, or if intergroup contact is not positive. 
 As this relates to the Religious Right, I think there are many opportunities in which this kind 
of approach may be successful. This approach offers a great benefit in that it can offer a meaningful, 
positive, and personal experience with a member of the outgroup. A real world example of this 
might be a recent news story which highlighted how residents of a small town which voted largely 
for Donald Trump was now angered over the threatened deportation of a local community leader.197 
Because of the personal connections with this person at an individual level, many people were able 
to see the individual beyond the label immigrant. In addition to that, given that whether or not one is 
a part of the Religious Right is externally apparent, it is not always clear when a person is speaking 
to someone who is not in the ingroup, and it may not be known how much contact someone has 
with those outside their group.   
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 As originally postulated by Allport, this approach to intergroup contact required four 
features: equal status within the contact situation, intergroup cooperation, common goals, and 
support of authorities. Through research previously cited, this kind of direct contact has been shown 
to reduce feelings of anxiety, threat, and negative outgroup evaluations. As with any approach, this 
has limitations for alleviating intergroup contact and situations where such contact may be 
detrimental. As cited previously, if the conflict is already violent, increased contact may simply 
provide more avenues for violence. Because this model requires four aspects for intergroup contact 
to be successful, this perspective can give people direct advice on how to set up intergroup 
encounters with the Religious Right in a way that is likely to end as a positive encounter.  
 This kind approach offers a lot when put in conversation with the Religious Right. In 
contact under Allport’s ideal conditions, there are several things which arise. Firstly, it has already 
been pointed out in other approaches the value of sharing common goals. Secondly, I have also 
previously pointed out the research which points to the success of this kind of contact in alleviating 
intergroup conflict. In the same way as the decategorization model, this approach may be 
particularly useful by building more complex understandings of people in the outgroup through 
positive interpersonal contact.  
 As with the other approaches, Allport’s Intergroup Contact model is not without its 
limitations. In regards to the Religious Right, it is necessary to point out some warnings for 
situations in which this may not be the best way forward. As with the other approaches, such 
contact may not always be helpful if such contact is perceived as a threat. Additionally, this 
approach in its original formulation requires four things to be effective; if one of the prerequisites is 
missing, this approach may prove to be either less effective or ineffective altogether.  
4.1 What these approaches may tell us about a way forward.  
 Individually, I hope I have suggested what strengths and weaknesses these groups may have 
for people to move conflict in a less toxic direction with the Religious Right. When taken all 
together, I believe there remain several things which these approaches may tell us about 
overcoming the identity-based, intergroup conflict with the Religious Right. Rather than simply 
identify one theoretical approach or offer up only one of these approaches as a means of alleviating 
conflict, I understand these approaches to be complementary. As presented, there exists research 
supporting each of the listed approaches to alleviate this kind of identity based intergroup conflict. 
Thus, what we learn from these approaches are multiple possible paths forward and I believe each 
approach can be a useful tool in the toolbox for approaching this conflict. Looking at these broader 
learnings, I next list what may be more implicit information derived from the information presented 
above.  
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 While this has not been explicitly stated, I believe each of these approaches requires 
listening to understand the person or group in the Religious Right for several reasons. In order to 
understand how a person self-categorizes, how they emotionally connect with their group, how 
salient their identity may be, what stage they may be at in Brewers spectrum, or any other important 
information required to understand a person or group’s social identity requires listening to 
understand. Unless a person can listen before he or she speaks, it will be impossible to adequately 
understand where a person or group is at. Furthermore, given what I have presented about social 
identities, this kind of listening is important in order for the person speaking with a member or 
group of people from the Religious Right to allow the person or group with whom they speak to be 
individuals rather than homogenized through categorization. While social identities are shared 
identity and operate under a shared definition, the way or reasons people categorize themselves 
within a set social identity can and will vary. Therefore, to understand the Religious Right and 
people who identify with it requires listening to the individual rather than falling back to 
categorizations of the group.  
 As a tool for understanding, Brewer’s spectrum is particularly helpful for identifying where 
the person or people who are a part of the Religious Right may be coming from and how open or 
closed to discussion they are. Understanding the different points of the spectrum may shape which 
approach is determined to be most appropriate to take to move forward in conflict. Additionally, to 
recognize the goals of the person or people to whom one is speaking is valuable – if the person 
belongs to a group which they simply understand positively, that is very different from a person 
who belongs to a group and is actively hostile to those outside of the group.  
 In each approach listed above, a potential for any method to backfire comes from a sense of 
increased threat to that group’s identity based on optimal distinctiveness theory. As such, it is 
important to disagree in such a way that it does not threaten the identity of a group one is in 
disagreement with. In regards to the Religious Right, there are several ways in which this must be 
accounted for. Firstly, it goes without saying that each person or group is different, and what may 
threaten one will not threaten another – once again, highlighting the importance of understanding 
the people one is interacting with. Secondly, there should be an awareness of the histories which go 
into the identity of the Religious Right. For example, as pointed out above, it has been a favored 
tactic of the Religious Right at times to play up the ways in which it is under some level of threat 
from outsiders. Because of this history, anyone approaching the Religious Right during a conflict 
should be aware of how their criticisms of or language about  beliefs, values, or actions may fit into 
a preexisting narrative as described by the Religious Right.  
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 The importance of positive interpersonal contact should not be overlooked. Regardless of 
the approach, it appears that this kind of positive contact can be helpful for personalizing the 
outsider and helping conflict become more productive. As pointed out early in the paper, if contact 
with the outgroup only occurs with others seen as typical outgroup members, this can have a 
negative, rather than a positive, effect. Particularly for the conflict the Religious Right understands 
itself to be in, where they are in an increasingly threatening world, for there to exist positive contact 
which humanizes those whom the Religious Right would see as its enemy seems important, if not 
necessary, for the conflict to move forward.  
 Because I understand each of these approaches to present different strengths and different 
possible weaknesses, this suggests the approaches are appropriate in different situations. As such, 
flexibility and the ability to apply different theories as they are appropriate is a valuable trait to have 
moving forward.  
 Additionally, it has been my goal to respect the Religious Right as a group of people who 
are shaped by identities like any other group. While I have not been uncritical, it has not been my 
purpose to make statements about whether the group is right or wrong, or make value statements 
about their beliefs; rather, I am trying to identify the motivations and desires of the group. In order 
for conflict to be productive, I believe this kind of respect puts us closer to productive conflict 
outcomes. Given the increasingly hostile ways of speaking – from those within the Religious Right 
and those critical of it – the solution is more respectful dialogue, not a dialogue that is dismissive of 
a group of people. Based on the research and the various models used above, it appears necessary 
for those who hope to change the system of conflict with the Religious Right to maintain this kind 
of respect in their work. Given that a social identities are a normal and often healthy reality of the 
human condition it is important to recognize that people in the Religious Right, by identifying with 
the group that they do, are not displaying defective behaviors or acting in a way that is not typical of 
all humanity. Each social identity is different and will deal with different issues. It is important to 
recognize that these actions are fundamentally human, and not those of fundamentalists.   
Conclusion 
The Religious Right seems as if it is a force in American politics that will continue to linger 
as a presence within the Republican Party. Because of the Religious Right’s position in society, 
both socially and politically, working with people who would claim this identity does not appear to 
be optional. This leaves, very simply put, two paths which to take, whether one identifies with the 
Religious Right or not: one continues towards a possibly toxic conflict, and the other path leads 
towards a more positive system of coexistence. I have demonstrated both the possibility and 
benefits of the latter.  
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 Using social identity theory as my theoretical base, I set out to explore the Religious Right, 
its conflicts, and how social identity theory may help us see ways forward to more productive and 
less entrenched conflict. I have shown that the conflicts in which the Religious Right is involved are 
identity based, and furthermore, shown the value of social identity theory in addressing such an 
identity based conflict. Through my application of several approaches to conflict based on a social 
identity theory, I have not only shown the value of social identity theory in providing conflict 
alleviating approaches, but shown how these approaches may indeed provide possible ways forward 
in the case of the Religious Right in the United States. While there are certainly limitations to what 
I have shown, I believe I have established a clear theoretical base for further research applying these 
social identity based approaches to the conflicts of which the Religious Right is a part as a 
meaningful way out of toxic conflict and towards a positive peace.  
Though I fully acknowledge the limits of what I have done, I believe there is a significance 
to what this research may mean. Because of the systemic violence linked to these conflicts as 
previously established, I believe the importance of recognizing these ways forward could be 
significant insofar as they may alleviate the conflict and reduce the systems of violence at work in 
the conflicts I have examined. With the chaos of the early weeks of the Trump presidency 
indicating a new divisive way of politics, as well as the way in which Trump has garnered support 
from the Religious Right, I believe these social identity approaches could prove particularly useful 
in the coming years, and that these social identity based approaches to conflict can trump this 
identity based conflict.  
 
Bibliography 
Ashmore, Richard, Lee Jussim and David Wilder, eds. Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and 
Conflict Reduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
Bilali, Rezarta and Michael A. Ross. “Remembering Intergroup Conflict.” In The Oxford Handbook 
of Intergroup Conflict, edited by Linda R. Tropp, 123-135. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012.  
Brewer, Marilynn. “Ingroup Identification and Intergroup Conflict.” In Social Identity, Intergroup 
Conflict, and Conflict Reduction, edited by Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder, 
17-41. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
Brewer, Marilynn. “Superordinate Goals Versus Superordinate Identity as Bases of Intergroup 
Cooperation.” In Social Identity Processes: Trends and Theory in Research, edited by Dora 
Capozza and Rupert Brown, 117-129. London: SAGE Publications, 2000.  
   
 
 59  
 
Brewer, Marilynn. “The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Can Research Inform Practice?” 
Journal of Social Issues 53(1) (1997): 197-211 
Brown, Steven Preston.  Trumping Religion: The new Christian Right, the Free Speech Clause, and 
the Courts. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002.  
Capozza, Dora and Rupert Brown. “Social Identity Theory in Retrospect and Prospect.” In Social 
Identity Processes, edited by Dora Capozza and Rupert Brown, 6-13. London: Sage 
Publications, 2000. 
Capozza, Dora and Brown, Rupert, eds. Social Identity Processes: Trends in Theory and Research. 
London: Sage, 2000.  
Citrin, Jack, Cara Wong, and Brian Duff. “The Meaning of American National Identity.” In Social 
Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction, edited by Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, 
and David Wilder, 71-100. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
Cuhadar, Esra and Dayton, Bruce. “The Social Psychology of Identity and Inter-group Conflict: 
From Theory to Practice.” International Studies Perspectives 12 (2001): 273-293.  
Davey, Monica. “He’s a Local Pillar in a Trump Town. Now He Could Be Deported.” New York 
Times, Febrruary 27, 2017. Accessed March 23, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/immigration-trump-illinois-juan-pacheco.html 
De Dreu, Carsten K.W. Social Conflict Within and Between Groups. New York: Psychology Press, 
2014.  
Deaux, Kay. “Models, Meanings and Motivations.” In Social Identity Processes, edited by Dora 
Capozza and Rupert Brown, 16-26. London: SAGE Publications, 2000.  
Dovidio, John F., Tamar Saguy, Tessa V. West, and Samuel L. Gaertner. “Divergent Intergroup 
Perspectives,” in The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict, edited by Linda R. Tropp, 
158-176. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Dodds, Graham G. “Crusade or Charade? The Religious Right and the Culture Wars.” Canadian 
Review of American Studies 42 no. 3 (2012): 274-300. 
Ellemers, Naomi, Paulien Kortekaas, and Jaap W. Ouwerkerk. "Self-categorisation, commitment to 
the group and group self-esteem as related but distinct aspects of social identity." European 
Journal Of Social Psychology 29, no. 2/3 (March 1999): 371-389. 
Ensari, Nurcan and Miller, Norman. “Decategorization and the reduction of bias in the crossed 
categorization paradigm.” European Journal of Social Psychology. 31 (2001): 193-216.  
Flippen, J. Brooks. Jimmy Carter, The Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011.  
Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1996.  
   
 
 60  
 
Gibson, James L. ”Do strong Group Identities Fuel Intolerance? Evidence from the South African 
Case.” Political Psychology, 27 no 5 (2006): 665-705 
Hewstone, Miles, and Greenland, Katy. “Intergroup Conflict.” International Journal of Psychology, 
35 (2) (2000): 136-144.  
Jussim, Lee, Richard D. Ashmore, and David Wilder. “Introduction.” In Social Identity, Intergroup 
Conflict, and Conflict Reduction, edited by Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder, 
3-14. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Kelman, Herbert C. “The Role of National Identity in Conflict Resolution.” In Social Identity, 
Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction, edited by Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and 
David Wilder, 187-212. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
Korostelina, Karina Valentinovna. Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics, and 
Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.  
Kuppens, Toon, Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, Sophie Dandache, Agneta H. Fischer, and Job van der Schalk. 
2013. "Social identity salience shapes group-based emotions through group-based 
appraisals." Cognition & Emotion 27, no. 8: 1359-1377.  
Marsden, George M.. Fundamentalism and American Culture : The Shaping of Twentieth-Century 
Evangelicalism, 1870-1925 (2). New York, US: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
Martin, William. With God On our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America. New York: 
Broadway Books, 1996.  
Monteiro, Maria Benedicta. “Dealing with intergroup conflicts in organizations: a  challenge to the 
right of diversity. PJSS 2 (2) 79-88, 2003.  
Olson, Roger. “Tensions in Evangelical Theology.” Dialog: A Journal of Theology. 42 no 1:76-85, 
2003.  
Optow, Susan. “The Scope of Justice, Intergroup conflict, and Peace.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Intergroup Conflict, edited by Linda R. Tropp. 72-86. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012.  
Prati, Francesca, Richard J. Crisp, Felicia Pratto, and Monica Rubini. 2016. "Encouraging majority 
support for immigrant access to health services: Multiple categorization and social identity 
complexity as antecedents of health equality." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 19, 
no. 4: 426-438.  
Roccas, Sonia and Andrey Elster. “Group Identities.” In The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup 
Conflict, edited by Linda R. Tropp, 106-122. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Schafer, Axel R. Countercultural Conservatives. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011.  
   
 
 61  
 
Slocum-Bradley, Nikki, ed. Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity. Burlingdton, VT: 
Ashgate, 2008.  
Smith, Gregory. ”Most White Evangelicals Approve of Trump Travel Prohibition and Express 
Concerns About Extremism.” Pew Research Center, February 27, 2017. Accessed on March 
23, 2017. Available from  http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/27/most-white-
evangelicals-approve-of-trump-travel-prohibition-and-express-concerns-about-extremism/ 
Staub, Ervin. “Individual and Group Identities in Genocide and Mass Killing.” In Social Identity, 
Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction, edited by Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and 
David Wilder, 159-184. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
Tropp, Linda, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012.  
Vallacher, Robin R., Peter T. Coleman, Andrzej Nowak, and Lan Bui-Wrzosinska. “Why Do 
Conflicts Become Intractable? The Dynamical Perspective on Malignant Social Relations.” In 
The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict, edited by Linda R. Tropp, 13-28. New York: 
POxford University Press, 2012.  
Verkuyten, Maykel and Borja Martionvic. “Minority Identity and Host National Identification 
Among Immigrants.” In Social Conflict Within and Between Groups, edited by Carsten K.W. 
De Dreu, 55-74. New York: Psychology Press, 2014.  
Vogler, Carolyn. "Social identity and emotion: The meeting of psychoanalysis and sociology." 
Sociological Review 48, no. 1 (February 2000): 19-43. 
Wagner, Ulrich, and Miles Hewstone. “Intergroup Contact.” In The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup 
Conflict, edited by Linda R. Tropp, 193-209. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
White, Robert W. “Social and Role Identities in Political Violence.” In Social Identity, Intergroup 
Conflict, and Conflict Reduction. Edited by Richard Ashmroe, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder, 
133-158. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.  
Wilcox, Clyde, and Carin Robinson. Onward Christian Soldiers?: The Religious Right in American 
Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.  
